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Using actual cases drawn from the field of health care ethics, my 
dissertation identifies and examines the implications of a set of 
common, but uncritically held presuppositions about what it means to be 
a person. Because they have been acquired without sufficient critical 
reflection, these presuppositions effectively prevent us from 
recognizing some crucial conditions and consequences of our unavoidable 
situation as persons, i.e., that we are dynamic and interdependent 
'works in progress' who, in order to persist and thrive, must maintain a 
homeostatic balance in and with an equally dynamic and interdependent 
environment. The dissertation investigates what these presuppositions 
are, how they come to be so readily and uncritically held and re-
inforced, and why their implications can have such a profound affect on 
how we think and act. 
My inquiry into these presuppositions and the problems they create 
and perpetuate builds on the work of John Dewey, especially his views 
concerning (1) ethics as the study of the interrelationships between 
persons and their environments, (2) logic as the pragmatic, dynamic and 
evolutionary theory of reflective inquiry and (3) democratic process as 
an ethical, as well as social, ideal. The dissertation will be 
conducted with specific reference to relationships that exist between 
persons in the field of health care. However, my conclusions should not 
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only bear directly on problems in health care, but should lead to a 
better understanding of persons as bio/psycho/social entities with all 
of the diverse needs and common, rational interests that such an 




The Argument Of The Study 
The way we, as a community of inquirers, look at obligations and 
responsibilities between persons is determined not only by the context 
of the relationships between those persons, but by our presuppositions 
concerning (among other things) persons, relationships, obligations and 
responsibilities. Like any other social institution, how the health 
care professions perceive themselves depends upon much the same thing: 
the contexts of their relationships, especially the particular social 
context in which they find themselves and their particular 
presuppositions concerning persons, relationships, obligations and 
responsibilities. 
This study is an examination of what constitutes obligation and 
responsibility between patients and providers in the field of health 
care. It will examine this topic by looking at relevant sets of 
presuppositions and relevant contexts. That is, it will begin by 
investigating standard notions of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence 
and justice as these have been conceived in recent health care ethics 
literature, and by examining the actual contexts of relationships in 
this social institution as these materially affect and are, in turn, 
affected by these conceptions. 
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As a field that is schooled in disciplined discourse, ethics has 
been instrumental in recent years in helping health care professionals 
to grapple anew--and to much greater effect--with ethically problematic 
cases. It has done this by introducing ethical theory and the 
philosophical tools of deliberate and systematic conceptual analysis 
into the field of health care. One of the main arguments for inviting 
professionally trained philosophers and ethicists to reflect and comment 
upon the relationships between patient and health care provider is the 
ability of the former to provide a much needed additional perspective 
for understanding the unique contexts in which these relationships 
occur. 
This additional perspective derives, in part, from the fact that 
every person is a potential reservoir of differing or novel insights 
about a problem. But it also derives from the fact that the kind of 
critical reflection practiced by ethicists and philosophers differs in 
both scope and intensity from the kind of critical reflection ordinarily 
engaged in by patients and health care providers. 
Among other things, ethicists working in health care have been 
instrumental in helping everyone involved begin to see more clearly the 
complex context of each health care situation, from its physical 
environment to its biological, emotional, aesthetic, religious, 
political, economic and cultural aspects, and in so doing to elucidate 
the interconnections between environmental/psychosocial aspects of 
cases. All of these aspects must be carefully weighed and their 
ethical relevance imaginatively examined for any ethical assessment of a 
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case to be considered thorough. 
Though often reduced to the merely biological, the medical facts of 
any given case will include--in varying degrees--any or all of the 
above-mentioned aspects. Hence, in a full articulation of any decision-
making process of each case, every one of these aspects must be taken 
into consideration and carefully examined as to its relevance to the 
case. Upon surviving such scrutiny, that aspect must be included as 
relevant data in the decision-making process. 
From the standpoint of the ethicist, the biological aspects are 
treated as 'givens' within which the remaining aspects can be examined. 
And correctly so, since an ethicist's role with regard to the biological 
facts of the case is, necessarily, limited to assuring that every 
re,sona})1e effort has been made to determine them correctly (e.g., that 
the proper specialists have been consulted and that there is enough 
objective data to warrant consensus among the health care professionals 
about diagnosis and prognosis), for only then can proper ethical 
analysis begin. 
However, from the standpoint of the health care professional, what 
these biological facts actually represent is merely a distillation of 
the field's best efforts to date in understanding very complex 
physiological processes. That is, they are not simple 'givens,' but in 
reality are open to what are, at times, rather wholesale modifications. 
In and of itself, this has never been an especially problematic matter 
for health care professionals themselves; they must quickly grow used to 
dealing with diagnoses, prognoses and therapies that must be established 
and instituted in the face of various degrees of ambiguity and 
uncertainty. 
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It is important to remember, in other words, that facts, though 
relatively stable for some purposes, are not permanent fixtures of 
existence nor need they be. Effective inquiry, like effective science, 
need not await absolute certainty but can--and, in fact, must--rely on 
the judicious use of statistical probability. So, in regard to the 
biological facts of the case, the role of the ethicist--much like that 
of the patient--is necessarily relatively passive. This is so, not 
because biological facts about any given patient are utterly fixed or 
other than statistical in nature, but rather because some participants 
to the conversation (in this case health care providers) are more 
qualified by virtue of their exposure to and deliberate cultivation of 
an intensely focused set of experiences. What the ethicist hopes for is 
a similar flexibility and openness to new understanding regarding the 
ethical and other contextual features of health care situations, new 
understanding that will grow as the ethicist's special skills are honed 
and refined through practice. 
One place where these biological aspects of a case can become 
especially problematic ethically is in health care providers' 
communication (and lack of communication) of them, of their 
consequences, and of the implications of their consequences to patients 
and their stipulated significant others. They can become problematic 
because the biological facts of a case belong to a person, i.e., a 
rational, sentient entity that necessarily exists within--and thus 
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cannot be understood in complete isolation from--an environment. That 
is, biological facts "belong to" a person in the sense that, though they 
are physiological data, their precise meaning depends upon how the 
patient understands that data, viz., in terms of how this data will 
affect her daily life and her understanding of herself as the primary 
author, as it were, of that life. Hence, a realistic meaning of these 
biological facts in this particular situation cannot develop without the 
existence of an engaged, on-going dialogue between health care providers 
and patient (or designated other). 
Certainly, ethicists have made a major contribution in this 
problematic area by helping health care providers become more aware of 
their obligation to communicate these biological facts, and to do so as 
sensitively and as unambiguously as possible. By means of this 
contribution, patients are given a greater opportunity for making 
intelligent, well-informed decisions about their own health care and to 
maximize their participation in that care. 
As for the psychological (including emotional and religious) 
aspects of a case, here too, ethicists have made important contributions 
to the thinking of health care providers and their patients. That is, 
they have assisted both patients and their care-givers to develop more 
imagination, sensitivity and responsiveness in identifying and 
understanding values--their own as well as those of others. This has 
encouraged a more active, responsible and balanced collaboration between 
health care providers and patients. Ethicists have also assisted health 
care providers in developing more effective conceptual tools for 
discussing such things as, for example, what constitutes decisional 
capacity in each particular patient or what presumed consent and 
informed consent are, how they differ and why. 
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Unfortunately, a third set of aspects are often more difficult to 
examine, for ethicists and for health care providers and patients alike. 
These are the social aspects which include political, religious, 
economic and any other cultural aspects of human existence. While 
ethicists have sometimes contributed to articulating the social aspects 
in problematic cases, this move is not common because of the sets of 
concepts, and the presuppositions on which they rest, that most 
contemporary health care ethicists employ. Even when made, it has 
usually been by abandoning the analysis of particular, concrete cases 
and by moving, instead, in the direction of sorting cases in terms of 
whether they are issues of micro- or macro-allocation, and then treating 
these issues as though they are entirely unconnected to and unaffected 
by one another. 
While this approach has led to some extremely helpful distinctions 
for certain kinds of analyses, especially in areas that concern 
political and economic institutions, all too often it has led to 
treating large scale social structures (e.g., the various professions, 
health care institutions, economic institutions and various public 
associations and affiliations generally) as though the problems they 
confront could be addressed in isolation from day-to-day health care 
encounters instead of seeing these as particular, concrete problems that 
occur within and are unavoidably connected to and shaped by the larger 
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social and cultural frameworks. 
This particular way of dealing with social issues in health care 
has often had another unfortunate effect. Namely, it has led many 
ethicists, as well as the patients and health care providers they serve, 
to treat the social aspects of particular cases as though they were 
analogues of biological 'givens' in a case, to be passively accepted 
rather than regarded as changeable, ethically significant and deserving 
of careful attention at the same time the more local details of the 
cases are being considered. For both ethicists and health care 
providers alike, the social aspects of the case can often appear to be 
unalterable conditions beyond discussion instead of material 
circumstances that are, in large part, also negotiable within 
communities. Since there is, as yet, little that can be modified 
concerning the circumstances of our biology in comparison to what there 
is, potentially, that can be modified concerning the social aspects of 
our lives, the biological and the social aspects are clearly not 
analogous in this respect. 
This disanalogy is the reason for the dissatisfaction felt towards 
a particular class of health care ethics cases by ethicists and health 
care providers alike; namely, cases in which they are struggling to 
articulate and to examine those alternatives available to patients and 
their families or significant others, alternatives that are located at 
the interface between the needs of individual patients and the values 
and priorities of the community, as these are represented by specific 
institutions within the community. 1 This dissertation will focus on an 
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examination of cases of this sort, in which elements of social context 
play such a crucial role in the ethical issues at stake but are, 
nonetheless, often overlooked or assumed to be unchangeable 'givens,' 
with little or no argument. 
In other words, the thesis of this dissertation is that the 
standard ways in which health care ethicists, health care providers and 
patients have tended to discuss and to analyse ethical issues in health 
care have not adequately addressed the possibility that social elements 
of a situation are not beyond examination, ethical analysis and critical 
reconstruction. Ethicists and health care providers alike have been 
inappropriately passive before these social aspects. This is why there 
can be little doubt that this area of concern would profit from even 
greater input from ethics as a discipline. 
My project will construct, test and defend an alternative to the 
approaches typically taken in the ethical analyses of such cases. I 
will provide some cases that are representative of this problem and, 
examining these cases carefully, I will first show how the approaches 
that I am critizing address them, and then explain not only what these 
approaches miss but, more importantly, why they miss it. I will 
demonstrate that these approaches typically involve presuppositions 
about persons, relationships, obligations and responsibilities that 
leave them unable to take adequate account of the social/contextual 
factors of a case. Their inability to inform us adequately about such 
cases, I will argue, is grounded in these defective presuppositions. In 
defending this view, I will, in other words, be challenging some rather 
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basic assumptions commonly made in contemporary health care ethics 
concerning persons, the nature of their relatedness and the meaning of 
what is often called the integrity and autonomy of persons. 
For the sake of having a convenient name for the forms of ethical 
analysis that I will be criticizing here, I will refer to them 
collectively as 'the standard approach.' The sets of concepts and modes 
of ethical analysis that I intend by this phrase will be illustrated in 
detail in chapter two. There I will show how 'the standard approach' 
deals with problematic cases in such as way as to highlight this 
approach's defects. In calling this 'the standard approach' I am not, 
of course, claiming that all contemporary health care ethicists practice 
it or that ethicists who employ other such concepts, presuppositions and 
modes of inquiry to issues in health care are automatically therefore 
considered inept. But by a significant margin, the approach that I am 
calling 'the standard approach' is the most common way in which issues 
are discussed in the health care ethics literature and have been 
discussed for nearly two decades. 
Hence, the appellation, 'standard approach,' is well deserved. The 
fact that it is so typical is not, however, the problem that concerns 
this dissertation, since it is written from a perspective that is 
philosophical rather than sociological. The problem to be addressed 
here is that this pattern of inquiry is seriously defective. It is 
built on presuppositions that leave it essentially blind, and therefore 
passive, to the impact of ethically important contextual (e.g., social) 
features of health care situations. This is what I shall demonstrate 
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here. 
A Rationale That Is Not Limited To Health Care 
While I will be looking specifically at problematic relationships 
between persons in the setting of health care, the basic assumptions 
that I challenge are certainly more fundamental insofar as they form the 
basis of how we often think about persons and the nature of human 
interaction in general. My investigation will show how these 
assumptions affect other related background assumptions, shaping 
attitudes and conduct towards a set of concepts about persons that 
includes (though it is not necessarily limited to) autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. 
There are a number of good reasons why someone interested in 
sorting out various presuppositions about persons and their 
connectedness would benefit from analysing the relationship between 
providers and recipients of health care. Of course, such a move is 
hardly novel. Plato, for example, thought that one of the best ways to 
get clear about the 'soul' is to look at the actual relationship of 
citizens to the polis which he treated as an inquiry into the 'health' 
of the soul. But there are other, more important reasons for using the 
health care context to raise questions about common presuppositions 
about relationships, obligations and responsibilities. 
First, there is a distinctive combination of intimacy and distance 
characteristic of relationships between providers and recipients of 
health care. For this reason, health care provides a richer context for 
studying relationships than settings in which only one or other of these 
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characteristics are evident. In other words, because health care 
relationships share aspects of both the intimacy evident in personal 
relationships and the detachment characteristic of impersonal 
relationships, at least as they are currently understood in our culture, 
they seem to be an exceptionally good place to focus a study of common 
presuppositions about relationships. 
Second, there is already an ongoing discussion among philosophers 
interested in health care about the appropriate model(s) of relationship 
health care should aspire to or adopt. Working in this area will 
provide an important 'head start,' since this study will be able to add 
to our understanding without having to initiate the inquiry de nova. 
Third, my own past experience as a health care provider 
(specifically as a nurse with more than fifteen years of experience from 
geriatrics to intensive care) can bring to such a project a familiarity 
with aspects of the health care setting that will help to focus the 
examination of these presuppositions on concrete, real life aspects of 
relationship and social context. An important risk of a foundational 
study of presuppositions and context in ethical reflection lies in its 
becoming too abstract and, thus, too difficult to translate back to the 
ordinary details of life. By focusing this philosophic inquiry on the 
health care setting, I hope to keep its reflections more concrete, 
precise and, therefore, accessible. 
Finally, for Dewey, whose philosophical work has guided much of my 
method in this study, the test of any philosophical theory is whether it 
actually helps in the resolution of a pressing problem. Should the 
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results of my inquiry help to clarify some aspects of the knotty 
problems in health care associated with the bio/psycho/social dynamics 
of persons then, according to Dewey, the project would be demonstrated 
to be of real value. 
Methodology 
This project utilizes an alternative methodology based on the 
critical and experimental attutide of reflective inquiry advocated by 
John Dewey. 2 That is, the methodology is critical, empirical, 
experimental, pragmatic, naturalistic, pluralistic and non-
reductionistic. While Dewey's contributions to this project will be 
explained more fully in chapter three, each of these terms deserves, for 
the moment, a brief explanation. The method of this project is critical 
in the sense that all reflection (including philosophic reflection) is 
treated as a scientific critique of ''causal antecedents and causative 
consequents." 3 It is empirical and experimental in the sense that, 
instead of attempting to posit some hypothetical account of human nature 
as an heuristic device, it begins with lived experience which it then 
subjects to a systematic accumulation of evidence through the deliberate 
modification, transformation and reconstruction of the antecedent 
material of that experience. 4 
The method of this project is pragmatic in the sense that 
experience is treated as an ongoing series of interactions--what Dewey 
called "a matter of simultaneous doings and sufferings"--between each 
living being and its physical and social environment. 5 Consequences 
function as tests of the validity of the results of critical reflection 
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on these interactions--with the proviso that these consequences are 
operationally instituted. 6 Thus, reflective inquiry is characterized as 
an inherently public, social activity, an activity that is curnmulative 
and evolving, an activity that has distinctive survival value for its 
practitioners, both individually and collectively. 
The method of this project is naturalistic in the following senses: 
(1) it holds that there is a common logical pattern of knowing in 
science and morals;, 7 (2) it rejects the belief that experience is some 
mysterious thing external, but somehow attached, to a living being; 8 and 
(3) it treats experience as a complex, evolving field within which each 
living being is a dynamic, interactive component within an equally 
dynamic, interactive environment. 9, lO That is, such a methodology 
targets, critically analyses and suggests a way of reconstructing 
presuppositions that ignore an unalterable aspect of the actual 
situatedness of persons: namely, that persons are fragile, responsive 
'works in progress'--simultaneously products and agents who, in order to 
preserve their integrity as persons, must maintain a dynamic homeostatic 
balance within an equally fragile and responsive environment. 
Finally, the method of this project is pluralistic and, therefore, 
non-reductionistic in the sense that, because persons are 
bio/psycho/social entities, what characterizes them as persons cannot be 
reduced to any one of these aspects alone--as, for example, the 
biological aspect of 'being alive.' Rather, persons are said to 'have 
lives,' which requires attention to the entire bio/psycho/social field 
of their existences. 11 Because the experience of persons is an 
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unavoidably bio/psycho/social phenomenon, efforts to increase our 
understanding of that phenomenon should be pursued in bio/psycho/social 
terms; i.e., what counts as inquiry, evidence and explanation cannot 
ignore and will be integrally tied to learning how the bio/psycho/social 
aspects of experiences dynamically interreact. According to this view, 
all concepts central to persons will be unavoidably and irreducibly 
bio/psycho/social. 
So, in general, how to proceed? The project borrows, at every 
level of inquiry, a stratagem favored by Plato's Socrates. Plato 
initiated a number of his dialogues with Socrates hailing a friend or 
group of acquaintances by way of two questions: "Where have you come 
from?" and "Where are you going? 1112 These queries pointed beyond the 
merely geographical. They served as foils for the purpose of 
introducing the personalities of the interlocutors and establishing the 
precise context and development of a problematic issue--everything 
relevant from the brute, physical features to more abstract, 
intellectual ones. A dialogue then ensued about the meaning of that 
problematic issue, wherein a variety of alternatives were solicited and 
offered--sometimes timidly, sometimes brashly, often enthusiastically, 
but always in a surprisingly democratic spirit--in answer to a third, 
usually unarticulated question: "How do we get there?" 
These three questions are basic, time-honored questions that 
structure virtually all intelligible and intelligent inquiry into the 
most abstract, theoretical, practical and/or mundane of situations or 
issues. 13 Such inquiry, when controlled, can transform experiences that 
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are indeterminate into experiences that are, to paraphrase Dewey, funded 
with meaning. 
The first question, "Where have you come from?" establishes the 
historical context of the inquiry--the past physical environment, 
biological parameters and psychosocial elements that enter into a 
situation or issue--in order that its presuppositions may be revealed 
and assessed. The second question, "Where are you going?" investigates 
the 'destination' or future of an inquiry, its meaning, its various 
aims, its possible consequences and the intentions, presuppositions and 
commitments of those initiating and benefitting from it. The third 
question, "How do we get there?" prompts the marshalling of various 
plans of action, the means by which tentative responses to the second 
question might be approximated and tested. 
Each of these three questions must be asked and answered 
sequentially in any controlled inquiry. Moreover, a lack of answers or 
paucity of solutions to the third question may necessitate a 
renegotiation of either what constitutes an acceptable answer to the 
second or, sometimes, even a reassessment of the first. While such to-
and-fro assessments and re-evaluations serve to hone the inquiry by 
clarifying its meaning and the various available options and their 
consequences, they do not change the basic structure of this pattern of 
inquiry. By maintaining this pattern, the goals and expectations of the 
inquiry are kept realistic and appropriate. Indeed, any intelligent 
inquiry, whether the subject matter is science or morals, must ask and 
answer these three basic questions in one way or another. 
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The characteristics of reflective inquiry that are embodied by 
these three questions are, in fact, the basis for Dewey's claim that, 
for critical, reflective thought to succeed, it must rely on the method 
of science. 14 For Dewey believed that the actual method of scientific 
inquiry is the best example we have yet developed of intelligence at 
work. This method is not the same as the pseudoscience that passes for 
so much of what is popularly considered scientific thought--a narrow, 
technical view of science in which changeless laws are uttered, 
memorized and externally applied. Rather, the method espoused here is 
the same continuous, progressive, democratic and collaborative process 
(including its painstakingly controlled and monitored antecedents and 
consequents) that occurs in laboratories, field work, and wherever 
communities of researchers wholeheartedly and cooperatively work 
together, imaginatively anticipating and offering alternative 
resolutions to actual problems of living. 
Summary Of Remaining Chapters 
In chapter two a number of select cases are presented in order to 
provide a careful analysis of how ethical issues in health care are 
standardly conceived and discussed today. In the course of this 
presentation, certain inadequacies in the standard approach become 
evident and prompt the following question: why is it that so much is 
overlooked in how the issues are conceived and discussed? It is 
proposed that these inadequacies occur because the standard approach in 
question relies on moral theories that are themselves based on 
presuppositions that are open to serious question; and it is suggested 
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that this difficulty can be addressed with the help of John Dewey. 
Chapter three is devoted to an examination of the key elements that 
this dissertation shares with John Dewey's pragmatic and naturalistic 
methodological approach. The purpose of such an examination is to help 
make explicit some of this dissertation's central assumptions and to 
provide cogent reasons in their defense. To that end, Dewey's theory of 
experience is reviewed. Next, a detailed analysis of his account of 
reflective inquiry is undertaken in order to clarify much of the 
approach and some of the substantive claims developed later in this 
work. 
In particular, Dewey understood reflective inquiry to be the method 
of intelligence, and described it as a complex, evolutionary and 
inherently public social activity that has distinctive survival value 
for its individual practitioners. For Dewey the capacity to engage in 
such reflective inquiry is what characterizes us as beings capable of 
understanding the nature of our relationships with the rest of the 
world, including the importance of social contexts and how these affect 
and are affected by how we perceive ourselves as persons. 
Also addressed in chapter three is Dewey's view of science as a 
paradigm for the method of critical inquiry. He reminds us that 
reflective inquiry is something that is done and not simply thought. 
Moreover, the melioristic character of reflective inquiry that follows 
from treating intelligence as a process that is both perspectival 
(individual) and falsifiable (public) is noted. By enhancing our 
ability to control how we progress both as individuals and as 
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participants in a community, reflective inquiry is the process by which 
we come to understand obligations and responsibilities and, thus, to 
recognize our uniqueness as ethical beings. 
In chapter four, certain key presuppositions of the ethical 
theories on which the standard approach to health care ethics rests are 
examined. These key presuppositions are central to the way personhood 
is standardly conceived, especially a much vaunted notion of autonomy as 
an isolated, atomistic locus of rational self-determination and self-
sufficiency are challenged. These presuppositions are analysed, 
criticized, reconstructed and carefully qualified in Deweyian terms. As 
part of this process, the following material conditions of persons are 
examined: (1) that throughout their lives persons experience basic 
needs15 which, when unmet, cause them to suffer and (2) that persons, 
whether they consciously appreciate their situation or not, depend on 
others for the prevention or amelioration of some portion of their own 
suffering. 
These material conditions strongly suggest that a person's 
experience is shaped by interdependence. By virtue of the fact that it 
permeates the very existence--if not the conscious experience--of all 
persons, interdependence is thus construed to be a standard 
characteristic of personhood. Therefore, we are justified in viewing 
persons as bio/psycho/social beings from our first efforts to understand 
them. 
Moreover, if interdependence is thus considered a significant 
characteristic and not simply a defect of persons, then it should also 
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be considered a significant factor in determining what constitutes 
persons as autonomous agents. This conclusion, however, runs counter to 
the prevailing assumptions about personhood in the ethical theories 
which underpin the current health care ethics approach. The prevalent 
view has been to set autonomy simply in opposition to heteronomy, thus 
effectively minimizing or ignoring the consequences and implications of 
the fundamentally interdependent existence of persons. In other words, 
if interdependence is a central feature of personhood, then these 
ethical theories must have something more to say about its role in human 
agency, responsibility and obligation. The antecedents and consequents 
of interdependence, including the influence that suffering from unmet 
basic needs has on the development of our understanding of what ethical 
obligation amounts to, will be taken more seriously here and hence, a 
more viable starting point from which to understand these ethical 
relationships between persons will be made available. 
In chapter five the cases analysed in chapter two by the standard 
approach used in health care ethics today are re-examined from the 
Deweyian perspective articulated in chapters three and four. This will 
serve to illustrate what a bio/psycho/social understanding of ethical 
obligation amounts to and how it operates. An analysis of these case 
analyses is then undertaken in turn in order to identify and then test 
and assess the methodological approach proposed, employed in and 
defended by this dissertation. 
In the concluding section of chapter five, the bio/psycho/social 
interpretation of personhood developed in this work is compared to the 
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static and atomistic rendering of personhood that characterizes the 
standard approach. This comparison reveals that a bio/psycho/social 
approach, because it is more sensitive to the delicate homeostatic 
mechanisms that preserve the integrity of persons in their relationships 
with their environment, offers a more flexible means for resolving 
specific problematic situations and should therefore be adopted as the 
most productive approach presently available to us for health care 
ethics; that is, for applying the full powers of human intelligence to 
the ethical issues that aris~ in health care. 
Endnotes 
1John Dewey would identify this dissatisfaction as the first step, 
however inchoate, in the progression common to all inquiry: the 
perception of an indeterminate 'hitch' in the flow of experience. This 
hitch becomes more determinate--i.e., it takes on more clarity and 
definition--during the process of inquiry. See LW 12:108-11 in the 
chapter entitled, "The Pattern of Inquiry." 
2For Dewey's most comprehensive treatment of reflective inquiry, 
see his 1938 work, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, LW 12. Alternatively, 
one can get a sense of what Dewey was up to from a careful reading of 
his article, "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality" 
which, though written in 1903, was included with only minor rev1s1ons in 
a 1946 collection of essays entitled, Problems of Men, (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1946, pp. 211-49.) See MW 3:3-39. 
3For Dewey, the moment we begin thinking about and discussing 
immediate experience, it is the means-consequence relationship that is 
being considered. That is, we evaluate immediate experience in terms of 
its relationships--the conditions that mediate it and the things that 




7Lw 14:62. Like Dewey, I wish to avoid what he criticized as 
"knowing in the orthodox sense," by which he meant an accommodation of 
self and its beliefs to conditions already fixed. 
8LW 14:17. 
9Lw 16:108-9. 
lOA brief explanation is in order here concerning my use of the 
term, "interactive." Dewey ascribed very precise functions to the 
terms, "self-action," "inter-action" and "trans-action." According to 
his notion of self-action, "things are viewed as acting under their own 
powers.'' Inter-action is the term Dewey used to describe a relationship 
"where thing is balanced against thing in causal interconnection." My 
use of interaction is actually closest to Dewey's use of trans-action: 
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where systems of description and naming [as opposed to "things" or 
"entities"] are employed to deal with aspects and phases of action, 
without final attribution to "elements" or other presumptively 
detachable or independent "entities," "essences," or "realities," 
and without isolation of presumptively detachable "relations" from 
such detachable "elements." (LW 16:101-4) 
I choose to avoid the term, 'transaction,' itself however, because of 
its prominent association today with exchange relationships in the 
marketplace. This current association fails to capture the 
transformative, evolutionary characteristics of the relationships that 
Dewey intended to convey by using the term, 'transaction.' In order to 
avoid this unintended association, I use either of two terms--
'interaction' and 'interreaction'--to convey Dewey's sense of the term, 
'transaction. ' 
11The distinction I draw between 'being alive' and 'having a life' 
will be explained in the section entitled Zoe and Bios in chapter four. 
12The most explicit example is the first lines uttered by Socrates 
in the "Phaedrus," but these three questions are asked or answered by 
Socrates in other dialogues including "Euthyphro," "Ion," "Theaetetus," 
and more obliquely in the "Protagoras" and "Timaeus." 
13This strategy has been adapted, refined, used and taught as a 
method of ethics consultation and medical case presentation for at least 
ten years now by Erich Loewy in his health care ethics programs. With 
his permission I have drawn liberally from his experiences and expertise 
in my description of this methodology. 
14MW 6:69ff, 177ff; MW 12:172ff. 
15Much has been written in ethics literature concerning what 
constitutes a basic need. It is beyond the scope of this work to argue 
for a particular view. For the purposes of the work, I will simply 
assume basic needs to be those needs necessary (1) to maintain 
biological existence (what I describe in chapter four as 'zoe,' or 
'being alive') and (2) to provide the possibility for pursuing and 
developing a biographical existence (what I describe in chapter four as 
'bios,' or 'having a life.') 
CHAPTER TWO 
CASE PRESENTATIONS AND STANDARD ANALYSES 
Introduction 
The following cases will be examined via a format of analysis that 
is considered standard in both the literature and practice of health 
care ethics today. It follows the format described in chapter one: the 
biological and pathophysiological aspects of the case will be examined, 
followed by the psychological, and then the social aspects of the case. 
While investigating these aspects and how the various participants in 
the case understand and value their implications, the central 
conflicting issues of the case and the benefits and drawbacks of the 
alternative courses of action for resolving them will be identified and 
discussed. 
In a standard case analysis, a course of action is then chosen to 
resolve these conflicts. The ideals, goals, characteristics and values 
that this course of action is thought to preserve or promote are 
expressed in principles that, in turn, are offered to explain and/or to 
justify the preferred decision or course of action. Among the main 
principles standardly invoked in health care ethics today are autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. The best known source for 
this standard approach and the four principles it utilizes is Beauchamp 
and Childress' Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 1 It is the approach 
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that has dominated the Georgetown summer workshops that have introduced 
so many participants to discussion of issues in health care ethics. 
The approach to health care ethics that these four principles are 
here used to typify has many other sources and representations in the 
contemporary practice of health care ethics. Though widely advocated, 
this approach has a number of critics; however, few of them challenge 
the presuppositions of the approach in the manner to be proposed here. 
Still, the widespread currency of this approach is common knowledge 
within the field of health care ethics, which is why its presuppositions 
are deserving of the careful examination offered here. 
Using this standard approach, three cases will be analysed in this 
chapter with a view towards examining the merits, and especially the 
demerits, of this approach. In chapter five, these cases will be re-
examined in order to explain how the corrected presuppositions about 
persons and their bio/psycho/social interdependence that are developed 
in the intervening chapters significantly alter our understanding of 
both (a) the nature and scope of the obligations between patients and 
health care providers in the three cases and (b) the principles and 
goals of health care practice that inform these obligations. 
Before turning to the case analyses, these four principles, as they 
are standardly conceived, need a brief introduction. Obviously, because 
volumes have been--and will continue to be--written about each of these 
principles and the often times conflicting values they embody, this 
brief introduction makes no pretensions of giving a comprehensive 
picture of any one of these notions--such a picture would, in itself, 
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require more attention than could feasibly be given it within this 
dissertation. That these principles continue to be so widely discussed 
and debated can only lend support to my contention that the way they are 
currently conceived and used can actually hamper, rather than enhance, 
the controlled inquiry needed for there to be well-crafted resolutions 
to problematic situations. 
Four Principles Standardly Invoked in Health Care Ethics 
Beneficence and Non-maleficence 
The Hippocratic oath, a pledge still taken by many upon entrance 
into the field of medicine, is symbolic of the important role that the 
ethical principles of beneficence and non-maleficence play in 
contemporary western culture. These principles have been given 
extensive treatment in classic texts dealing with the philosophical 
bases of health care ethics. 2- 5 A famous injunction derived from that 
oath--strive to help, but above all, do no harm--influences the 
professional practice of all health care providers today precisely 
because it confronts the ambiguous character of expertise and its 
consequences: the greater the power to help, the greater the possibility 
to do harm. 
The last part of that injunction--above all, do no harm--is the 
basis of the principle of non-maleficence. The injunction serves as a 
reminder that actions always have consequences and that agents are 
largely responsible for the consequences of their actions even when 
those consequences extend beyond the agents' intentions or expectations. 
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The first part of that injunction--strive to help--forms the basis 
of the principle of beneficence. By means of their special expertise, 
health care providers strive to help their patients. Of course, this 
'help' can take many forms, from disinterested offering of advice to 
actual appropriation of decision-making responsibilities for a patient. 
A significant part of the ongoing dialogue about beneficence in the 
health care literature is an attempt to determine how to distinguish 
clearly between actions that are beneficent and those that are not by 
addressing the issue of what constitutes helping patients--and by whose 
definition. 
Justice 
While the principle of justice has been conceived from a number of 
conflicting perspectives, 6 these various conceptions do have certain 
features in common: (a) that justice is obligatory and not simply 
optional and (b) that justice is concerned with giving persons what is 
their due. Of course, what is in dispute between these conflicting 
conceptions of justice is how to determine (a) what constitutes 
'obligation' and (b) what constitutes 'due.' However, any discussion of 
'obligation' or 'due,' in turn, rides piggy-back on a determination of 
what constitutes 'persons' and what it is that makes them autonomous 
which, because it is also a matter of dispute, hardly provides more 
clarity to the issue. 
In a great majority of health care ethics cases analysed today, the 
way in which the notion of justice is customarily perceived--as my 
sample cases are intended to show--begins by isolating the individual or 
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individuals involved. That is, it emphasizes a view of persons as 
isolated and self-contained. This, in turn, significantly affects the 
way in which the scope of the notions of obligation and due are 
interpreted. 
Autonomy 
The last--but hardly least--principle to be examined is that of 
autonomy, which requires that persons be respected and which is 
intimately connected to the notions of liberty and self-determination. 
The principle of autonomy finds its classic expression in the version of 
Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative wherein persons are required to 
treat each other never merely as means, but always at the same time as 
ends in themselves. 7 Because it underwrites an important, albeit 
imprecise, set of characteristics thought to be central to persons, the 
principle of autonomy has been invoked both to defend and to condemn all 
sorts of interactions between persons. 
Take, for example, the issue of paternalism--i.e., treating 
patients without their informed and willing consent and justifying such 
treatment on the basis of a professional obligation to benefit one's 
patients--which continues to loom so large as an issue in health care 
practice. The principle of autonomy has been invoked both in criticism 
against and in defense of paternalism. 
On the one side, it has acted as a counterbalance to a belief still 
shared by many health care providers: namely, the belief that their 
special expertise makes them more qualified to determine what is in the 
best interests of patients than patients themselves. Opponents of this 
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belief use the principle of autonomy to argue that persons must be 
presumed to be capable of making their own decisions. Some of them even 
argue that the only obligation experts have is to make available their 
expertise, which persons might then freely ignore, heed or disregard. 
On the other side, the principle of autonomy has been appropriated 
to mount one of the strongest defenses for paternalism: a justification 
of paternalistic actions based on the claim that such actions constitute 
the only means available for preserving or re-establishing a patient's 
autonomy. Invoking the principle of autonomy, these thinkers argue that 
special expertise not merely permits but, under certain conditions, 
obligates experts to engage in paternalistic practices. 
As can be seen by this brief introductory discussion, the same 
principle can be, and often is, invoked in support of opposing sides of 
an issue. This suggests that it is not these ethical principles 
themselves that are so central to the decision-making process. Instead, 
it suggests that there is something else behind these ethical principles 
(viz., ethical intuitions) which, when left unexamined, will influence 
the direction and outcome of that process in ways that cannot be 
anticipated. 
Certainly, without unexamined ethical intuitions of some sort, the 
decision-making process could never get off the ground. But, unless our 
unexamined ethical intuitions undergo the same careful scrutiny to which 
the rest of the process is subjected, there is no way to understand or 
to assess the role they play or, more importantly, their influence over 
us. The case analyses presented in this chapter illustrate how an over-
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reliance on ethical principles can actually hinder discovery of and 
reflective inquiry into the role that these important ethical intuitions 
play in decision-making. 
A Brief Look at the Role Ethical Principles Play in Case Resolution 
In order to clarify how ethical principles are used and what aspect 
of them is emphasized in standard case analyses, a representative 
description of such principles will be examined. The one provided here 
is offered by Glen C. Graber and David C. Thomasma in Theory and 
Practice in Medical Ethics: 
Moral principles express fundamental theoretical norms ... A moral 
principle is an ought-statement which may express (or yield) a 
command about (imperative), a precept towards (prescriptiveJ, or a 
description of (descriptive) conduct to be done or avoided. 
This definition implies, among other things, the idea that 
principles, like rules, are 'summary,' insofar as they are useful in 
summarizing antecedent cultural behaviors and practices and their 
outcomes. That is to say, they are useful, shorthand formulations that 
convey how problems presently faced have been addressed successfully in 
the past. Such a summary description of principles easily lends itself 
to support a kind of formalistic interpretation of principles, values, 
rules or theories consistent with an applications model of problem-
solving, i.e., a predominantly top-down strategy that applies concepts 
to specific issues or particular cases. This formalistic interpretation 
is presupposed in much problem-solving that occurs in the field of 
health care ethics today, irrespective of whether the actual theory 
behind the activity of problem-solving is predominantly deductivist, 
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dialectical, principlist, casuistical or situationalist. 9 
One of the weaknesses of the applications model is that it can too 
easily lull the problem-solver into thinking of the disposition of a 
case as 'solved' rather than 'resolved,' two words that can be used to 
capture an important distinction. That is, the application of 
principles to 'solve' a case can suggest a discrete and circumscribed 
activity comparable to, and often defined in terms of, an externally 
imposed intervention that has a fairly clearly demarcated beginning and 
end. Such a portrayal of problem-solving can encourage closure of such 
finality or definitiveness that the further consequences that inevitably 
flow from a case and its disposition are all but ignored. 
However, to 'resolve' a case carries with it connotations of 
progressive, mutual re-adjustment. That is, it is a 'resolution' in the 
sense that it is a developmental reworking through a problematic 
situation by carefully attending to its discrete context and its 
possible solutions, while maintaining an openness to the inevitable and 
ongoing ramifications of the solutions' consequences in light of these 
mutual re-adjustments and the internal dynamics of the situation itself. 
Such problem-solving by resolution describes Dewey's activity of making 
an indeterminate situation more determinate. 10 
In contrast to the top-down strategy of the applications approach 
that will be used to solve the cases in this chapter, resolution (as it 
has been outlined here and will be utilized in the reconstructed cases 
in chapter five) requires, at minimum, openness to the reciprocal 
interreaction between principles as tentative guides (not stipulations) 
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and the rest of the experiential context of a problematic case. That 
is, rather than finding a solution via a systematic execution of a 
predetermined principle or algorithm, resolution necessitates openness 
to the experiential context of a problematic situation, attention to the 
variety of possibilities that principles can represent and 
acknowledgment of the effect that the particular development of a case 
resolution has on future practice and behavior, both individual and 
institutional. 
A standard objection against an applications model runs as follows: 
since no rule, principle or theory has ever been shown to be adequate or 
complete, there is no independent mechanism to be 'applied,' and thus, 
no solutions to practical issues can be deduced. The objection offered 
in this dissertation is more fundamental: it denies the possibility of 
an independent mechanism that can be 'applied' by denying the 
presumption that either 'things' (be they material or conceptual) or 
their meanings can have free-standing or isolated existences. Since no 
'thing' exists in a vacuum, neither can its meaningfulness. That is, 
things that exist (whether that existence is material or conceptual), 
exist only within a bio/psycho/social context. This bio/psycho/social 
context provides the setting within which an implicit meaning of a thing 
is represented by the way it functions within that context. 11 As such, 
things are necessarily interconnected bio/psycho/social phenomena. 
Prime examples of complex material and/or conceptual 'things,' are 
means and ends-in-view: they are always context-dependent. Because they 
are generated in particular, distinctive situations by individuals who 
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are particular and distinctive members of a shared bio-social context, 
what is treated as an end-in-view in one situation (or even in different 
aspects of the same situation) actually functions as a means to some 
other end-in-view in another situation (or different aspect of the same 
situation): their meanings depend on context. 
Therefore, descriptions such as Thomasma and Graber's do not 
address merely the summary aspect of principles, but their practical 
aspect as well. Once this practical aspect of principles is taken into 
account, the top-down strategy of the 'applications' model is eclipsed 
by the requirement that principles, like rules and theories, must be 
tested for their adequacy by their actual or hypothetically anticipated 
practical implications (i.e., by their future consequents) and not the 
other way around (i.e., by their antecedent conditions alone--which, of 
course, includes consequences, but these are the consequences of past 
experience). However, this is best understood in the course of actual 
case analysis, and it is to this activity that we must now turn. 
Case Analyses 
Case #1: The 'Rescue Medicine' Conundrum 
During a recent cold winter an indigent, elderly man was 
brought into a local emergency room with pneumonia. He was 
close to starvation and suffered from hypothermia because he 
could not afford to eat or heat his room after paying his 
rent. While in the emergency room, the man suffered a cardiac 
arrest and was stabilized after aggressive cardio-pulmonary 
resuscitation. But, after three weeks, he remained completely 
unresponsive and totally dependent on a ventilator. During 
this time social services discovered that the man had no 
family or friends. The health care team suspected that the 
patient would remain permanently comatose, and a neurological 
consult confirmed the team's suspicion that the patient's 
prognosis was bleak. 
An ethicist was consulted to discuss whether it was 
ethically appropriate to discontinue this man's treatment and 
was told by the health care team that between $100,000 and 
$200,000 had been expended treating this man. The members of 
the health care team concurred that, had it been possible to 
restore the patient to a semblance of his pre-hospitalization 
condition (which it was not), they would have felt no qualms 
about continuing such treatment--which would have, in effect, 
returned this patient to the material conditions responsible 
for his hospitalization in the first place. 11 
Analysis 
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The biological facts of this case are fairly straightforward, and 
had the neurological status of the patient been unclear, prognosis could 
have been further corroborated by blood flow studies of the brain. 
These studies can, because of their high degree of accuracy, help to 
classify patients into three rather clearly defined categories: brain-
dead, permanently comatose and persistently vegetative. A patient is 
classified as brain-dead when no blood flow to the brain can be 
visualized. (In all fifty states, brain death is considered the legal 
equivalent of the death of the person. This makes it legally acceptable 
to withdraw life support without fear of being charged with patient 
abandonment or homicide.) 
A patient becomes a candidate for inclusion under the second 
category when there is blood flow to the brain but, after being 
stabilized, the patient remains completely unresponsive even to deep, 
painful stimuli. The person to whom this has occurred is most likely, 
after three weeks, permanently comatose. Patients falling into the 
third category exhibit what appear to be episodes of waking and sleeping 
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but otherwise remain unresponsive. In this condition, there is blood 
flow to the brain but either it is insufficient or it has, at some 
point, been interrupted long enough to cause severe damage to or 
destruction of those areas of the brain associated with the 'higher,' or 
cognitive functions so characteristic of persons. Patients such as 
these, after being stabilized, will remain in what is called a 
persistent or permanently vegetative state. So long as individuals can 
be stabilized on life support--i.e., so long as oxygenated blood can be 
circulated to the cells of the body--their vegetative functions (i.e., 
those involuntary functions of glands and organs that are controlled by 
the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems) can be artificially 
assisted indefinitely. 
There are psychological facts about this case that are troubling. 
It is known only that this patient is--and will remain--unable to speak 
for himself, that he has no family or friends and that he has been 
living in extreme poverty. Social services have researched his case for 
any further data that might be helpful, but have been unable to learn 
any information that might prove helpful in piecing together the man's 
history. Thus there is no concrete idea of what his wishes might have 
been concerning continuation or withdrawal of life-extending treatment 
under these circumstances. In effect, this patient's previous isolation 
and poverty, along with his present condition of health and current 
inability to communicate, to judge or to make choices have made it a 
practical impossibility to anticipate how he would have chosen for 
himself regarding this situation. 
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The social aspects of this case are, by standard analysis, fairly 
straightforward. Because health care is such an important culturally 
shared value, health care providers are committed by their respective 
professional codes of ethics to treat each patient under their care with 
respect. This commitment to patients has long been reflected in formal 
statements about the primary goals and values of health care providers, 
which have traditionally included: 
1. curing whenever possible 
2. relieving pain and alleviating symptoms 
3. maintaining/improving function and minimizing loss of function 
4. avoiding gratuitous harm and unnecessary risk 
These goals have been listed here in what has conventionally, at least 
in the United States, been considered their usual order of importance. 
All health care professionals today are deeply committed to some version 
of these primary goals of health care for their patients. The items may 
differ in number, emphasis or ranking, depending on a variety of 
considerations that include: (1) the particular health care profession 
studied, (2) the particular health care provider's own hierarchy of 
values and (3) the exigencies peculiar to the particular case at hand. 
Still, the obligations of care-givers to patients and the principles 
that express those obligations are ordinarily construed in terms of 
concerns such as these. 
Unfortunately, the first two of these goals are precluded by this 
man's pathophysiology. That is, neither a cure nor an alleviation of 
symptoms is possible and, since the patient is not conscious, he cannot 
have pain. The third goal is precluded except for minimizing loss of 
function; but, since this man's only functions are vegetative, it is 
debatable whether the language of goals and values can continue to 
convey anything more than a symbolic connection with this patient's 
situation. Lastly, what is supposed to count as 'harm' and 'risk' to 
patients in vegetative states is even less clear. 
36 
Since little has been gleaned from the above-mentioned goals and 
values that ordinarily assist health care teams in determining how to 
care for their patients, a proponent of an 'applications' approach would 
counsel the health care team to appeal directly to the ethical 
principles informing these goals and values, i.e., autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. Because the patient is 
indigent, he will be afforded, at least in principle, all of the same 
treatment alternatives that federal, state and local support makes 
available to any indigent patient within the community. Therefore, 
under a standard analysis of an individual case such as this, the health 
care team's concerns about justice are ordinarily limited to assuring 
that similar cases be treated similarly, i.e., that all of the social 
support mechanisms customarily available to patients in similar 
circumstances have been solicited and utilized. 
This patient's persistent vegetative state renders him incapable of 
making his own treatment decisions. Because this patient has left no 
advance directives of any sort, the health care team has no way of 
ascertaining how he would now wish to be treated. Since the patient is 
incapable of either direct or indirect self-determination, the relevance 
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of the principle of autonomy to this particular case is limited to 
mandating that respect for this patient obligates the health care team's 
participation in making treatment decisions for this patient. While a 
request for a court-appointed legal guardian would satisfy the team's 
legal obligations to the patient, it does not eliminate their ethical 
responsibilities. That is, even with a legal guardian designated to 
make treatment decisions, the health care team is still ethically 
accountable for whatever treatment (or non-treatment) they ultimately 
provide. 
Thus, advocates of a principlist approach would claim that the 
principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are the ones central to 
the solution of this particular case. Yet, these principles offer no 
means for deciding whether beneficence and non-maleficence are best 
expressed by continuing or discontinuing this patient's life-sustaining 
treatment. In the final analysis, no matter how carefully the case is 
examined and weighed, these principles often end up serving only as post 
hoc rationalizations for the health care team's conflicting intuitions 
as to what might count (or, alternatively, if anything even can count) 
as 'beneficial' or 'burdensome' care for a patient limited to a 
vegetative existence. 
The push, of course, is for closure. The health care team is 
committed to solving the immediate problem that confronts them: 
identifying and meeting their ethical obligations to this particular 
patient. A plan of care was, with considerable discussion, finally 
crafted for the patient in this case. After consultation with the 
hospital ethicist, the health care team concluded that life-extending 
treatment offered the patient no benefit. 
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The health care team requested that a legal guardian be assigned to 
the patient, be informed of the patient's situation and asked, as the 
patient's legal representative, to give permission for withdrawal of 
life-extending medical treatment. The guardian assigned by the court 
concurred with the position of the health care providers and granted 
permission to withdraw all medical treatment except for comfort 
measures. Subsequent to the removal of the ventilator, the patient's 
respirations and heart beat became erratic. Within minutes the 
patient's own spontaneous respirations and heart beat ceased. The 
patient's eyes became fixed and dilated, and he was pronounced dead. 
Because there was no way of ascertaining what this patient's wishes 
might have been, the health care team and legal guardian defended this 
decision to withhold treatment as the one that best reflected their 
concern and respect for this patient and his situation. They were 
agreed that since even delaying the decision-making process is a 
decision to do something, whatever decision was made would, in fact, 
constitute an act of substituted judgment. Respecting this patient 
entailed careful evaluation of the alternatives in terms of their 
fidelity to the general obligation of the care-givers to practice non-
maleficence and beneficence towards patients by choosing the alternative 
most consistent with the values and ideals that society has tacitly 
endorsed and patients have come to expect health care providers to 
support and protect. Both the care-givers and the legal guardian 
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defended withdrawal of life-extending treatment by arguing that it has 
been their experience that most persons having the opportunity to decide 
this issue in advance for themselves would not choose to be sustained in 
a vegetative state. 
Case #2: Medical Treatment For A Social Ill 
A frail, elderly man without relatives or visitors has 
lived in an extended care facility for the past five years. 
While needing physical assistance with daily activities, such 
as bathing and walking, he is oriented to time and place. 
With increasing frequency over the past two years the 
following pattern of behavior is observed: the patient 
abruptly informs his health care providers that he will no 
longer take fluids or food because he wants to die. 
Within several days, the man becomes semi-comatose and is 
sent to the nearest emergency room where he is re-hydrated by 
means of intravenous fluids and/or naso-gastric intubation. 
Upon recovery, he consistently expresses regret that he is 
still alive and disappointment with his care-takers for having 
over-ridden his wishes. The patient temporarily resumes 
adequate consumption of fluids and food, only to repeat the 
cycle in a few months' time. 
Analysis 
Assessment of this case requires a very careful medical work-up to 
rule out any endogenous depression, i.e., depression caused by organic 
processes that may be causing or exacerbating this patient's behavior. 
Even the most minor physical symptom, if it becomes chronic, can cause 
patients to become frustrated and depressed enough to have periods of 
hopelessness. Only after the health care team is assured that there is, 
to the best of their knowledge, no underlying biological or chemical 
origin for such behavior can their analysis be extended so as to tease 
out the psychological and social factors in the case. 
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Next, the psychological aspects of this case must be ascertained. 
The health care team needs to make a careful assessment of the patient's 
mental status, in both his compliant and non-compliant periods. This 
assessment should include both passively observing the patient's 
behavior and actively interviewing the patient to elicit his perceptions 
about his situation. It is crucial for the health care team to 
ascertain whether the patient understands and can explain his situation 
and his conflicting behavior patterns, including the fit between his 
intentions and his actions and the relationship between his actions and 
their likely consequences. In other words, he must be able to provide 
coherent reasons for his intentions and in defense of his actions. 
Such an assessment is necessary to determine whether this man has 
'decisional capacity,' the term currently being used in the fields of 
health care and health care ethics to describe the ability of persons to 
make autonomous choices about treatment alternatives. While there are a 
number of ways it has been described, 12 decisional capacity standardly 
includes these five criteria: 
1. understanding: the patient must be able to comprehend and 
discuss with a reasonable amount of coherence the relevance of the 
information that has been disclosed by the health care providers 
2. rationality: the patient must be capable of reasoning 
appropriately about means and ends--the patient should be able to 
anticipate the probable consequences of choices or actions and, in 
contemplating an end, should be able to indicate ways in which it might 
be reached 
3. opportunity: when time permits, the patient must be given 
sufficient time for deliberation to the fullest extent possible 
4. absence from coercion: the patient must be protected, as far as 
possible, from internal forms of coercion (e.g., pain, faulty processing 
of information) and external forms of coercion (e.g., economic pressure, 
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intolerable environmental conditions, etc.) 
5. authenticity: the values and world-view invoked by the patient 
to explain present decisions and behavior should be reasonably 
consistent with the values and world-view held by the patient in the 
past 
To the degree that these five criteria are met, patients are 
considered capable of making autonomous decisions about their health 
care. That is why one of the most important assessments care-givers 
make in each and every medical encounter is an assessment of a patient's 
decisional capacity. In those patients considered to have decisional 
capacity, the principle of autonomy requires care-givers to respect a 
patient's right to make his or her own personal health care decisions, 
irrespective of whether the care-givers agree with the particular 
decision in question. Parenthetically, it is important to note, here, 
that decisional capacity is not the same as legal competence. 
"Competence" is a technical legal term and is best reserved for its 
technical legal meaning. By law, all persons who are twenty-one or 
older (or who have demonstrated to the court that they have reached the 
age of reason) are presumed competent unless formally and specifically 
adjudged otherwise. 
From the dialogue that inevitably occurs between the health care 
team and this particular patient in the course of his care, it should be 
possible for the care-givers to elicit from the patient a coherent 
account of his behavior and expectations, including whether he 
understands the factual relationship between his actions and their 
likely consequences. The patient's past records should be reviewed for 
insights into the possible reasons for his conflicting sets of behavior 
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patterns. For example, has anyone previously asked the patient about 
his views concerning death, what his life plans and goals both are and 
were, and how he relates these to each other? Perhaps it is not so much 
that he wants to die as that he simply does not want to continue to live 
in this manner. 
In addition, the health care team should investigate whether the 
patient has exhibited a chronic or intermittent fixation concerning loss 
of control over his life, a fixation that may render him unable to make 
a realistic assessment of his actual over-all situation. Perhaps he 
feels disenfranchised and abandoned by his cornmunity--not an 
unreasonable or unjustified observation, given the way the frail and 
elderly in our society are often treated. 13 Does the patient interact 
thoughtfully and coherently with his environment? Does he have any 
sustained relationships with anyone at the facility? These are the 
kinds of questions that must be asked and answered as thoroughly as 
possible in order to ascertain whether the patient adequately 
understands his situation and is capable of making autonomous choices 
regarding his health care. 
In this particular case the health care team requested a 
psychiatric consultation. The psychologist found that the patient 
demonstrated a clear understanding of the implications of his refusal to 
take food or fluids in both his compliant and non-compliant phases. His 
reasons for taking these actions remained consistent in both phases: he 
had outlived all of his friends and family, and no longer had any 
outside interests. The patient felt that, while he had lived a very 
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full and active life, he now experienced no personal or vicarious joys 
or satisfaction in his continued existence and was unable to accept the 
extent of his dependence on his care-givers. He had, in sum, nothing of 
value to live for and, unable to accept such a life of dependency, 
preferred that his life be over. 
When asked why he would return to a compliant stage after his bouts 
of rejecting food and fluids, he replied that battling his care-givers 
was such hard work that he needed time to regain his strength. In other 
words, his compliant phases were not evidence of inconsistency in his 
understanding or his reasons for acting as he had. The psychologist 
concluded that, in spite of the fact that the patient's behavior seemed 
to be exacerbated by an exogenous depression (a depression that is 
caused by factors external to the patient), there was no indication that 
this patient's capacity to make decisions was impaired. 
A factor that weighs heavily in any psychiatric evaluation is the 
realization that, as in this patient's case, being depressed does not 
automatically render a person incapable of making rational decisions. 
There are circumstances in which depression is a most reasonable 
emotional response, so much so that its lack might actually be construed 
as an inappropriate or unreasonable emotional response. 
The social aspects of the case are fairly straight-forward on the 
standard approach. This man claims no family or friends and no social 
or religious affiliations. He receives minimal social security benefits 
and resides in a typical state-run extended care facility. While he 
participates in the activities that occur at the facility, he does so 
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indifferently, as though fulfilling empty requirements. He is distantly 
polite, but remains firm in his rejection of all attempts to persuade 
him to give up his desire to end his life. But we will see that this 
is, at best, a superficial account of what is socially significant here. 
The members of the health care team have, in this case, a 
commitment to a view of the patient's good that appears to differ 
significantly from the patient's. 14 This is because the health care 
professions place a very high value on preserving life in our society. 
They are committed to offering life-extending treatment to patients who 
are not terminally ill and, thus, come to equate such treatment with 
acting from the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. 
Therefore, a patient who demonstrates clear evidence of decisional 
capacity while persisting in what the care-givers see as self-
destructive behavior can be exceedingly frustrating for care-givers. 
Unfortunately, to continue rescuing this patient from his own 
behavior while failing to change his underlying rationale for that 
behavior will only compound the problem since, in addition to being 
frustrating and futile, it actually increases this patient's distress. 
This mismatch has not been adequately addressed by either the standard 
approach to health care ethics or the ethics of the health care 
professions. One primary source of the mismatch in this case lies in a 
difference of emphasis or focus concerning the meaning that 'life' has 
for the health care team and the patient respectively, a topic that will 
receive more detailed analysis in chapter four. 
Generally speaking, however, the health care providers' focus is on 
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life as a means to an end, as a necessary condition for the possibility 
of anything else. But as a necessary means to every possible end, life 
so understood can appear to have an absolute value. Consequently, it is 
all too often the case that, an underlying, unstated and unrecognized 
assumption by health care providers develops that, irrespective of the 
quality of a particular patient's life, life must treated as an end in 
itself and, thus, as desirable by all rational patients. From this 
perspective, choosing not to continue living is construed as irrational. 
The four primary goals of health care providers mentioned earlier 
in the first case of this chapter, as well as the principles that direct 
them, are therefore seen as directed towards sustaining life. In this 
case, however, the patient has repeatedly demonstrated his rejection of 
life as inherently valuable. He finds it both counterproductive and 
irrational to pursue--or to be forced to pursue--its continuance. He 
has not, in fact, lost sight of his life as a means, but considers it to 
be a means that not only no longer serves his ends, but actually 
frustrates them. It is possible that his care-givers might help him to 
see value in continuing to live, i.e., to see valuable ends to which his 
life is a means. But, should such efforts fail, the mismatch between 
his views and the care-givers' response to the standard views of their 
professional obligations will persist. 
Another source of the frustration for the care-givers lies in their 
recognition of the causal connection between this patient's sustained 
rejection of his current existence and the social conditions 
contributing to the quality of that existence. That is, our society's 
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economic commitments to the elderly have tended to be grudging, at best. 
As a result, sustained attempts by our culture to include, as active and 
valued members of the community, elderly who are no longer completely 
self-sufficient, remain half-hearted and ineffectual. As with the 
previous case discussed, the care-givers involved with this man's case 
are concerned to provide this patient with care that is equitable to 
other patients in similar circumstances. But, since elderly patients in 
these circumstances are frequently sent to nursing homes that, in one 
degree or another, effectively remove them from societal interactions, 
the principle of justice, as standardly conceived, offers little solace 
for patient or care-giver alike. Here, one might say that, while the 
principle of justice is formally recognized, there are, as it were, no 
'habits' in place--no institutional structures, no familiar patterns of 
practice, no recognizable means--for its effective realization. 
In addition, even when the care-givers are sensitive to this 
connection, the prevailing view of the care-givers' obligations to 
patients is silent concerning what, if anything, care-givers can or 
should do to address this issue. As a result, care-givers can come to 
feel as though they have been thrust into the position of fulfilling the 
tacit, formal requirements the health care institution promises the 
public without access to the most effective means of doing so. One such 
means might be a political voice that can bear witness to the adverse 
effects that seemingly isolated and unrelated social conditions have on 
the health and lives of all individuals, but especially the weak, poor 
and elderly. But this is not something ordinarily considered an ethical 
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requirement of health care professionals. 
Furthermore, each of these four patient-centered goals can 
represent an expression of sensitive caring. Yet there are conflicting 
interpretations about their meaning and relevance for any given 
individual, especially in light of the psychosocial realities of this 
patient's life. As a result, any one of these goals, when assumed 
without the participation or approval of a patient who has decisional 
capacity, can result in that patient being treated merely as means to 
ends that, in reality, no longer include him. 
This is a most inexcusable form of paternalism irrespective of 
whether it is motivated from the principles of beneficence or non-
maleficence or not. Hence, pursuing any of these goals as values 
removed from the patient's psychosocial reality or appealing to any of 
the principles that guide us in understanding these goals as if they 
were isolated and apriori without discussing what, in each particular 
case, counts as good reasons in favor of their support is worse than 
meaningless. Doing so prevents patients who have some degree of 
decisional capacity from participating to the degree that they are able 
in decisions about their own situation. This would, in effect, cause 
the care-givers to violate the autonomy principle in the name of 
benevolence. As a result, actions that the care-givers construe as 
flowing from the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence can 
actually promote or increase, rather than ameliorate, a patient's 
suffering. 
Once again, mis-matches and gaps in analysis derive from the 
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inadequacy of the concept of personhood and relationship presupposed by 
the standard approach. In this particular case, the health care 
providers decided that, since the patient was not terminally ill, they 
could not passively acquiesce to his wishes to be allowed to die as a 
result of his refusal of fluids and food. They are left with the 
alternative of continuing to send this patient, when he becomes unstable 
and semi-comatose, to the emergency room, to be aggressively treated for 
his self-induced dehydration and starvation. 
Case #3: Hyperacute Rejection Syndrome 
During an otherwise unremarkable pregnancy, a 26 year old 
woman developed myocarditis, a severely damaging inflammation 
of the heart which interferes with the ability of the heart to 
pump blood efficiently. Although she eventually delivered a 
premature but viable and healthy infant, the patient's own 
cardiac function deteriorated to the point where a transplant 
was the only remaining chance for saving her life. After 
delivery, a properly matched donor heart eventually became 
available and she underwent a transplantation that involved no 
immediate complications. 
Several hours post-transplant and while she was still in 
the recovery room, the patient's cardiac function rapidly 
began to deteriorate. It was apparent that she was 
experiencing a 'hyperacute rejection' (a process of organ 
transplant rejection whose etiology is poorly understood and 
which in about 95% of cases leads to repeat rejection should 
another transplant be attempted). The patient was placed on 
mechanical pump support as the newly transplanted heart could 
no longer provide the pumping action required to keep the 
patient alive. While she is currently awake, able to speak 
and rational, the mechanical pump is, at its present stage of 
technological development, only a stop-gap measure. 
Therefore, if this patient does not receive another heart 
transplant, she will die. 
When a heart which is a good match for this patient 
finally becomes available, it also happens to be an equally 
good match for another potential recipient who is awaiting 
transplant for the first time. The hospital ethics committee 
is asked whether the transplant team should re-transplant this 
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patient or give the heart to the other waiting candidate. 
Analysis 
Some of the biological facts of this case are quite clear in their 
implications. This young woman will die unless a second transplant is 
attempted. In addition, since her first transplant failed because of 
hyperacute rejection, the likelihood that she will reject the second 
attempt is 95%. The current rejection rate for heart transplants on a 
first attempt is approximately 5-8%. Therefore, if the other waiting 
candidate is given priority, there is a significant increase in the 
probability that the salvaged heart will not be rejected. 
Unfortunately, an important biological aspect of the case remains 
problematic. Hyperacute rejection is a syndrome that can be neither 
prevented nor, given the current state of the art, corrected after it 
occurs. Moreover, there is no way of anticipating which particular 
patients are at a greater risk for developing this syndrome. In other 
words, while statistics can offer valid inferences about the 
characteristics of a group of persons on the basis of numerical 
information obtained from a randomly selected sample of the group (i.e., 
the inference is from sample to larger population group), it cannot be 
used in reverse to identify which individuals within the population 
group exhibit the characteristics in question. Therefore, since 
patients prone to hyperacute rejection syndrome cannot be identified in 
advance, the syndrome cannot be used prospectively either to disqualify 
certain potential transplant recipients or to modify their ranking on 
the waiting list. 
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As far as the psychological aspects of the case are concerned, one 
would want to know precisely what the patient and her family and/or 
significant others had been told pre-operatively about transplantation 
and its possible complications, about the dismal prospects of surviving 
hyperacute rejection syndrome should it occur, and about the conditions 
under which re-transplantation would or would not be considered as an 
option. One would also want to know the patient's response to this 
information and her understanding of its implications. In addition, 
while this patient is currently presumed to have decisional capacity, 
the health care team or teams involved need to elicit from the patient 
just what that amounts to for her, from her particular perspective. 15 
The main social aspects of the case are three-fold and concern the 
relationships between (1) the patient and the larger community, (2) the 
patient and the health care professionals that are her current care-
givers and (3) the community and the care-givers. As far as the first 
relationship is concerned, the very existence of the national transplant 
program and all of the various social institutions connected with it 
clearly imply a de facto commitment on the part of the larger community 
to the quality of the lives of its individual members as potential 
transplant recipients. 
Similar to the commitment of health care professionals to patients 
expressed in their respective codes of ethics, this commitment of the 
community to its members is governed by the principles of beneficence 
and non-maleficence. 16 However, along with this commitment come 
utilitarian considerations of distribution that may directly conflict 
with particular patients' best interests as well as the care-givers' 
obligations to patients. Hence, these considerations can place the 
principles of autonomy, beneficence and/or non-maleficence in direct 
conflict with the principle of justice. 
51 
For example, for the transplant team to deny re-transplantation to 
this patient--assuming she would want to be re-transplanted--and to 
transplant the other potential recipient would clearly provide the 
greatest possibility of a successful organ transplant and, hence, 
increase the likelihood that the salvaged heart will not be rejected. 
However, this is something that care-givers find extremely discomfiting 
in their relationships with their patients, since denying re-
transplantation to the first patient will directly result in her death, 
no matter who else might be saved. Hence, it should be an important 
part of the obligation of the community to its members--potential 
patients and health care providers alike--to address the need for very 
explicit criteria in order to maximize equitable distribution of 
salvaged organs. 
As far as the second relationship, the one between patient and 
care-giver, is concerned, though the health care team does have a 
relationship with other potential recipients, it differs from their 
relationship with this patient whose death, without re-transplantation 
is both imminent and certain. The death of the operated patient will 
predictably occur within hours; the death of the waiting recipient might 
be anywhere from a few hours to days, weeks, or possibly even months. 
While the death of both is certain, the recent transplant's is more 
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imminent because the potential recipient's own heart is still 
functioning, albeit poorly. Hence, given the prevailing view of the 
special obligations generated by the patient/provider relationship and a 
lack of institutional guidelines concerning re-transplantation in 
patients who develop hyperacute rejection syndrome, the transplant team 
will understandably see itself as having little choice but to offer re-
transplantation to the patient whose first transplant has failed. 
Yet, at the same time, under the prevailing view of the providers' 
obligations to patients, the mere acceptance of a patient as a candidate 
for transplant automatically establishes a patient/provider 
relationship. As discussed previously, this relationship traditionally 
entails a wholehearted commitment on the part of the care-givers to 
embark upon a course of therapy most beneficial for that particular 
patient, which includes maximizing that patient's medical good in terms 
that can--as much as possible--be understood, identified with and 
accepted by the patient. Therefore, once a health care team embarks 
along a course of therapy for a patient under their care, the patient 
expects this commitment to be whole-hearted and within the customary 
framework of what is available to all patients under similar 
circumstances. 
Considering their bleak prognoses, it arguably would be more 
rational simply not to make re-transplantation an available option to 
patients who develop hyperacute rejection syndrome. However, for health 
care providers to make this determination on a one-to-one basis at the 
bedside would utterly transform the tacit but, nonetheless, deep and 
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therapeutic relationship of trust that has developed between patients 
and providers under the prevailing view of patient/provider 
relationship. This is why 'rationing at the bedside'--the practice of 
making the care-givers responsible for resource allocation at the 
bedside on a case-by-case basis--is considered by many working in the 
field of health care to be both therapeutically and ethically suspect. 
That is, when the community asks care-givers to adhere to protocols 
that, in effect, disadvantage some of their patients to the advantage of 
others, it is asking these care-givers to act in ways that place them 
squarely at cross-purposes with the commitments, values and principles 
they have traditionally been asked to honor towards their patients. 
As far as the third relationship is concerned, the one between 
care-givers and community, it is also a relationship of implicit mutual 
obligations. Care-givers are obligated to the community in several 
senses. First, the training and practice environments of care-givers 
exist, and are supported and encouraged by public institutions and the 
pooled resources--which are not solely economic--of the community. 
Second, the health care professions are licensed--i.e., given a unique 
privilege earned by virtue of their demonstrated expertise--by the 
community to engage in practices that are restricted to them alone. The 
community, in turn, is obligated to these care-givers who, because of 
their specialized training, improve the over-all quality of the 
community through education, research and their ability to provide 
increasingly more sophisticated levels care to patients. 
However, as in the second case analysis, when the community tacitly 
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endorses and reinforces the special and whole-hearted one-to-one 
commitment of care-givers to individual patients while, at the same 
time, it requires them to make allocation decisions between their 
patients--all of whom are recipients of this special commitment--it is 
inevitable that there will be serious conflicts not only between these 
commitments, but between the principles that inform these commitments as 
well. 
The hallmark of an ethical dilemma is that, irrespective of what 
choice is actively or passively undertaken, some incommensurate good--be 
it principle, interest, ideal or value--is irretrievably lost. But, 
still, there are better and worse ways of identifying the implicit 
features of a dilemma, so that a particular choice might, at least, be 
more compellingly drawn and defended as the less ethically objectionable 
and, thus, preferred alternative. Because the standard approach relies 
on the algorithmic application of principles that, in turn, presuppose 
conflicting visions of what it is to be a person, it is incapable of 
offering a persuasive alternative. Moreover, if it is to succeed and, 
at the same time remain internally consistent, the standard approach 
would have to appeal to some meta-principle, or set of meta-principles, 
in order to explain and/or justify how these principles are to be 
applied when they conflict. The standard approach does not succeed in 
this respect. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DEWEY'S METHODOLOGY, PURPOSE AND CENTRAL ASSUMPTIONS 
Introduction 
In numerous writings and lectures throughout his long career, 
Dewey addressed what he considered to be the central problem of modern 
life, namely, that of finding a way to restore the 
integration and cooperation between man's beliefs about the world in 
which he lives and his beliefs about values and purposes that should 
direct his conduct.1, 2 
Dewey was convinced that no headway will be made in addressing this 
central problem until creative intelligence replaces dogma in the vital 
task of resolving problems (whether they have been labelled 'moral' or 
'scientific') that confront individuals in their daily lives. For Dewey 
creative intelligence is both the process and product of reflective 
inquiry, an unending and dynamic process that is a central 
characteristic of sentient beings and the sine qua non of intelligent 
behavior. 
To the degree that beings can use this process of reflective 
inquiry to understand their individual and collective interests and 
values, they are able to participate actively in both the modification 
of existing interests and values and the creation of new ones, as well 
as in the actualization of their interests and values in the rest of 




Since Dewey's method of reflective inquiry and its assumptions are 
central to this dissertation, what is needed at this point is a 
description of his approach and some cogent remarks in its defense. To 
that end, this chapter will review the basic characteristics, aims and 
implications of Dewey's naturalistic and pragmatic theory of experience. 
The multi-perspectival, pluralistic approach that underlies Dewey's 
philosophical perspective will be defended here, not as something 
infallible, but as a most potent antidote against presuppositions 
standardly accepted in health care ethics that misdirect our 
understanding of experience in general and of relationships with other 
individuals in particular. 
Dewey's Methodological Perspective 
Few philosophers have managed to combine theory and practice in 
their lives as successfully as did John Dewey. 3 Like the evolutionary 
philosophy he espoused, his own philosophical perspective grew from a 
kind of Kantian intuitionism through Hegelian idealism and into various 
stages of instrumentalism, culminating in an empirical naturalism that 
emphasized reflective inquiry as the most effective mechanism for 
understanding and controlling the continuous and dynamic interreactions 
between our physical, biological, psychological and social 
environments. 4 
Dewey's alternative to the methodology used in traditional 
approaches in ethics is fairly straightforward. He argued that instead 
of constantly trying to find ready-made prescriptions or formulae to be 
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internalized as habits and routinely applied to problematic social and 
ethical issues, we need to cultivate a more versatile characteristic of 
our intelligence, one that has been restricted, at least for the past 
few centuries, to the narrow, practical sphere we call science. The 
habit Dewey wants to see more widely acknowledged and whole-heartedly 
adopted when addressing any perplexing issues--whether they concern 
fields that are often narrowly designated 'science' or the realm that is 
customarily treated separately as 'morals'--is the critical and 
practical activity of reflective inquiry. 5 
Dewey was convinced that many of the ills that plague modern 
society are the result of denying or minimizing the engaged and 
practical nature of reasoning. Dewey's experimentalism was the result 
of his overwhelming need to see the world whole by constructing what he 
called 
a logic, that is, a method of effective inquiry, which would apply 
without abrupt breach of continuity to phenomena designated by both 
of these words [viz., 'science' and 'morals']. 6 
In Logic: The Theory of Inguiry, 7 Dewey identified inquiry simply 
as the systematic and progressive determination of an indeterminate 
situation. He painstakingly described what he called the continuum of 
inquiry as the process by which beliefs and knowledge are acquired. 8 A 
rather radical thesis fundamental to his account was that logical forms 
accrue to a subject-matter when it is subjected to controlled inquiry. 
By this he did not mean simply that logical forms are revealed or 
discovered, but that these logical forms originate in the operations of 
inquiry. 9 
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This has two very important implications. First, the continuum of 
inquiry is thoroughly pragmatic. For Dewey, this meant that the goal of (-
inquiry--the search for truth--is neither a quest for certainty nor a 
search for knowledge of some ultimate reality that exists independent of 
our experiences or beliefs. Rather, the goal of inquiry is pragmatic in 
the sense that what we identify as 'true' set of statements or beliefs 
will depend on how well it helps us to understand experience and to 
guide further conduct. ;:::.:; According to Dewey this means that consequences , 
will function as the necessary tests of the validity of propositions 
"provided these consequences are operationally instituted and are such 
as to resolve the specific problem evoking the operations. 10 
Second, every aspect of an indeterminate situation--means and ends, 
meanings and values, intentions, perspectives and consequences--when 
subjected to reflective inquiry, undergoes an evolutionary development 
in the process of being converted into "one that is so determinate in 
its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of 
the original situation into a unified whole. 1111 
Hence, when Dewey uses the term 'consequences,' he is not limiting 
its meaning to a product of a narrow and linear process, the arguably 
narrow perspective of which the consequentialistic approach to ethics is 
often accused. He is reminding us instead that every aspect of our 
actions and our reflections on them must constantly be considered in 
terms of its impact on every other aspect--and upon itself as well. In 
other words, this is not merely a linear, future-oriented or forward-
looking perspective. Rather, because it is a process in which we, as 
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reflective agents, actively participate, reflective inquiry reconstructs 
our past and present as well as our future. 
A situation becomes indeterminate and, hence, ripe for reflective 
inquiry whenever any reflexive activity--whether personal habit or 
public practice--is, for any number of reasons, blocked, disrupted or 
fails to produce an expected result. Such an indeterminate situation 
then becomes problematic when our knowledge or understanding of it fails 
to correct or explain it. Our very recognition of a situation as 
'problematic' already entails a complex and dynamic process in which 
means, ends and perspective are thrown into doubt. In other words, our 
awareness of a situation as problematic signals that reflective inquiry 
is already underway. 
Moreover, how an indeterminate situation is envisioned as a problem 
determines not only what information will be considered relevant to it, 
but what will be identified or ruled out as possible solutions to be 
tested and evaluated. Just as inquiry is occasioned by an indeterminate 
problematic situation, the elements of the problematic situation are 
progressively reconstituted and, ideally, made more determinate by 
inquiry. In short, understanding the world in which we live is a 
process of which we are a part, and any knowledge that we might gain 
comes from taking part in events in an intelligent--i.e., purposive 
rather than reflexive--way. 
While the resolved or reconstructed situation solves a particular 
problem at hand, it also sets the stage for further inquiry by becoming 
not only a means to further ends-in-view, but the source of a whole new 
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set of interconnected problems: it is, in this sense, simultaneously an 
end and a means. Recognizing the multifaceted and evolutionary nature 
of the elements which constitute our experience permits us to locate and 
understand situations and their solutions experientially, and not as 
arbitrarily and artificially isolated exercises unconnected to daily 
living. To understand more fully the uniqueness and power of Dewey's 
account of reflective inquiry it is helpful to examine his theory of 
experience. 
Dewey's Pragmatic Theory Of Experience 
One of the most frequent accusations levelled against Dewey by his 
critics was (and is) that his philosophy blurs rather than clarifies 
important distinctions that are traditionally respected by philosophers. 
But, unlike those who claim that philosophy is essentially the art of 
making fine, precise distinctions, Dewey insisted that, what ever else 
it is, philosophy is a 'doing;' that is, it is the means by which we 
attempt to use our intelligence to make sense of our existence, to see 
the world whole. As a matter of fact, Dewey agreed that precise 
distinctions and their analyses are an important part--but only one 
part--of that activity. That is why he constantly warned against the 
folly of allowing any distinction to assume the status of a settled 
belief writ large, so to speak, whereby the meaning of a distinction 
becomes isolated from the particular problematic situation in which it 
was originally addressed. 
Dewey often criticized this common but subtle reification of 
distinctions, calling it 'the' philosophic fallacy. 12 Dewey saw this 
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reification as a by-product of the quest for knowledge of some ultimate 
reality independent of experience. Dewey rejected the metaphysical 
assumptions behind this quest insisting that, for us, the importance of 
distinctions, like any other statements or beliefs, lies in their 
usefulness for making sense of experience and for guiding choice and 
action in daily life. That some distinction 'is the case' always 
involves contextual interpretation of the related aspects of the 
particular case within which the distinction is being made. Even the 
fact that inquirers might agree about a distinction remains ambiguous 
until the story of how and where they came to agree is articulated. In 
other words, the reification of distinctions blurs their usefulness to 
us. 
Throughout his career, Dewey called for replacing the customary 
tradition which combines "atomistic particularism with respect to 
empirical material and Platonic a priori realism with respect to 
universals" with a naturalistic view in which "every experience in its 
direct occurrence is an interaction of environing conditions and an 
organism. 1113 In other words, the world and our reflections upon it 
constitute, as it were, a unified field: the world and our understanding 
of it are not to be considered apart from one another since neither 
exists apart from the other for us. 
For Dewey, experience is not the isolable product of an interaction ~-
between separate entities and objects. Nor is it an intersection 
between the subjective field of a perceiver and objective 'facts' 
neutrally read off of nature. Rather, it is a continuous transactional 
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process wherein perceiver and object are progressively re-constituted. 
There is nothing mysterious about this process. We not only presuppose 
it, we expect it and, at times, we specifically invoke it--as when we 
ask a person to tell us what she 'sees' in the abstract designs of a 
Rorschach test or when scientists provide us with computer-enhanced 
photos of Jupiter. 
As early as 1896, Dewey introduced his re-interpretation of the 
reflex arc, a concept foundational to the science of physiology. 14 
Dewey saw in it a means of explaining the unity of experience in all of 
its complex diversity and generality. Because experience is actively 
undergone and not passively observed, the stimuli and responses within 
experience are not insulated one-way circuits. Rather, they reverberate 
in a multi-directional, responsive and reciprocal manner that modifies 
every aspect of, as well as everything that undergoes, the experience. 
Dewey continued to build upon this basic notion and by 1938 
provided in his massive work, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, a detailed 
and systematic treatment of the dynamic commonalities of the reciprocal 
interactions which occur between all organisms and their environments--
commonalities, by the way, that are necessary for the very possibility 
of developing the kind of individuation that persons consider to be a 
defining feature of sentience: 
Whatever else organic life is or is not, it is a process of activity 
that involves an environment. It is a transaction extending beyond 
the spatial limits of the organism. An organism does not live in an 
environment; it lives by means of an environment ... the only source 
of restoration of energy. Not even a hibernating animal can live 
indefinitely upon itself .... The processes of living are enacted by 
the environment as truly as by the organism; for they are an 
integration. 15 
65 
This description has even more significance for interactions 
between complex, sentient organisms than it has for interactions of 
primitive one-celled organisms since the more complex the organism 
and/or the environment become, the greater the complexity and number of 
new and different dynamic interreactions that can possibly affect and be 
affected by the life of the organism: 
Indeed, living may be regarded as a continual rhythm of 
disequilibrations and recoveries of equilibrium. The 'higher' the 
organism, the more serious become the disturbances and the more 
energetic (and often more prolonged) are the efforts necessary for 
its reestablishment. The state of disturbed equilibration 
constitutes need. The movement towards its restoration is search 
and exploration. The recovery is fulfilment or satisfaction. 16 
As it is described here, an organism's response to a stimulus is 
much more than just a mechanical application of some pre-established 
means necessary to some antecedently given end. Rather, it is a 
complicated cascade of reciprocal readjustments by organism and 
environment to a series of mutually generated stimuli and responses. It 
is within the course of such dynamic interreactions that organisms and 
environments acquire stability and that organisms become progressively 
more individuated and potentially more self-aware. 17 
Just as primitive organisms, if they are to survive, must rapidly 
develop the ability to differentiate between self and non-self in the 
course of their interactions with their environments so, too, do more 
complex, sentient organisms, including human beings. Basic textbooks in 
human physiology and psychology detail the initial inability of neonates 
to recognize self from non-self either immunologically (biologically) or 
psychosocially. Individuation, first biological and then psychosocial, 
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is a progressive, developmental affair that is intimately connected with 
actively experiencing an environment. A perspective that is based on 
this much richer, bio/psycho/social account confirms the distortion that 
can occur in inquiry when any element of this complex and dynamic 
integration is examined in isolation from the environment in which it 
occurs. Literally speaking, that element will become incomprehensible. 
According to Dewey, bio/psycho/social integrity can be effectuated 
in two ways: blind impulse and intelligence. 18 To the degree that 
humans are sentient organisms, they are capable of choosing intelligence 
over blind impulse in order to advance their goals while continuing to 
maintain their bio/psycho/social integrity. That is, to the degree that 
they are self-aware and have memory, they are capable of engaging in 
sustained, self-directed reason. They can make distinctions about 
relevant similarities and differences, and they can choose to form the 
habit of exercising creative intelligence--Dewey's word for a habit of 
responsive and responsible, reflective inquiry--instead of relying on 
blind impulse to maintain or to restore what Dewey calls dynamic 
equilibration. 19 
Science As A Paradigm For Methodology 
Most of Dewey's critics--and even some thinkers sympathetic to his 
agenda--misunderstand his wholesale endorsement of the scientific method 
for all inquiry. It was never Dewey's intention to reduce ethics, 
religion or any other humanistic enterprise to a science, if by science 
is meant a descriptive account of material change. On the contrary, 
Dewey rejected any dualistic assumptions that separate science and 
values. According to Dewey, science can exclude human interests and 
valuings no more readily than such fields as ethics and politics can 
exclude the inquiries commonly labelled science, much less science in 
the broader sense Dewey intended by this word. 20 
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Rather, Dewey's point in praising science was to emphasize the 
unprecedented successes possible in any field or endeavor when dogma and 
intolerance are replaced by reflective inquiry. For Dewey reflective 
inquiry, when intelligently pursued, requires simple curiosity and an 
open but distinctively critical attitude: a willingness to suspend 
belief and expectation and the patience to cultivate healthy doubt until 
evidence is accumulated. Such an attitude rejects, for example, the 
anti-intellectual temptation of 'premature closure,' the practice of 
making a too hasty assumption compounded by the selective marshalling 
facts to confirm it. 
According to Dewey ideas are exciting possibilities, the social 
products of intelligent and creative individuals who have been 
habituated to the process of reflective inquiry. 21 Hence, ideas--
whether the ideas of science or the ideas connected to values--must 
never be treated as dogmas to be asserted; rather they are live 
hypotheses that are continually open to testing and manipulation. No 
matter how 'settled' a belief or idea, it must always be potentially 
falsifiable and open to public scrutiny. Its very status as a settled 
belief is, after all, the result of its continuous reconfirmation in 
actual practice. Dewey believed that these features of reflective 
inquiry have been most consistently and successfully modelled in the 
collaborative efforts of scientific communities than by any other 
sustained human enterprise to which we might look for examples. 
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In other words, what Dewey referred to as real science--as opposed 
to mere technological production or the rote replication of the 
intellectual products of real science--succeeds because it embodies the 
public process of deliberate and critical, but always open-ended 
reflective inquiry from the very beginning of an indeterminate 
situation, where our unreflectively held valuings are challenged, 
through the complex process of attempting to make that situation less 
indeterminate. This process includes identifying the indeterminate 
situation as a problem, theorizing about it and its possible solutions 
and then testing and evaluating the most likely means of resolving it. 
According to Dewey, whenever we engage in real science we are employing 
precisely this meaning of reflective inquiry. When he calls for a 
'scientific treatment of morality' what Dewey is asking is that we 
assume this distinctive critical attitude of reflective inquiry towards 
all things--material and immaterial alike--which have developed value 
and meaning for us. 22 
Consequently, any account of morality that offers a single, 
unimpeachable system of evaluating ethically problematic situations will 
have closed itself off to elements of experience that are needed if 
reflective inquiry into ethical issues is to take place. On Dewey's 
account this closure nearly always occurs because some distinction that 
in the past has proven extremely valuable in a specific ethically 
problematic case or context has been reified into a universal and 
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unchangeable norm instead of being understood as one of many potentially 
valuable tools forged out of past fruitful inquiries. Like any tool, 
because of its empirical status, these distinctions are subject to 
critical reflection, open to modification and, thus, cannot be fixed or 
immutable. 
For Dewey, reflective inquiry is also a dynamic social affair: it t· 
is, ideally, a democratic process designed to give meaning and value to 
our experiences. As an abstract social ideal, democracy has often been 
associated in contemporary American culture with a vision of the 
individual as a pre-existing entity standing over against community. 
That is not the sense of the term, 'democratic,' that is intended here. 
Rather, the term, 'democratic,' is used here to describe a process--and 
an attitude about that process--that is public, social and collaborative 
precisely because experience itself is public, social and collaborative. 
And so, inquiry is democratic in three important respects. First, 
like science, inquiry actively builds both directly and indirectly on 
the results of the past experiences of many individuals. Hence, inquiry 
is public. Second, even though reflective inquiry is carried on by 
individual persons, their individuality is the result of ongoing 
interreactions between a self-conscious entity and its environment 
(which includes other self-conscious entities). Thus, inquiry is 
social. Third, even though each person's experiences are of a world 
that is populated and shared by other persons, each person has a unique 
history that is distinctively brought to bear in reflecting upon any 
experience. Since life's experiences are so very interconnected, myriad 
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and complex, each person's narrative of his experiences is a potentially 
valuable resource for others. Therefore, inquiry that is carried on by 
persons is much improved by collaboration. 
In other words (mine, not Dewey's--though consistent with his 
intent), whether viewed as a body of accumulated wisdom or regarded as 
an ongoing process, reflective inquiry is carried on by self-reflective 
individuals dialogically, but in the very broadest sense of that term, 
i.e., referring neither to a pattern of logical argumentation nor to a 
mere synthesis of two opposites, but rather to the kind of democratic 
and interdependent engagement that occurs when a community of 
individuals come together seeking solutions to common problems. This 
community can be any group--scientists, politicians, the town hall, a 
family, the health care team. Such dialogue occurs whenever any number 
of individuals come together to listen to one another, and to address 
together whatever is problematic that they face together, in the attempt 
to understand each other's different perspectives and to modify their 
responses accordingly. This kind of living, evolutionary communicative 
engagement Dewey regards as the sine qua non of reflective inquiry. 
Some might also want to construe reflective inquiry as a 'dialogue' 
with oneself. Certainly this tendency is present in individualistically 
oriented societies like our own. However, Dewey would insist that this 
'internal dialogue' is dialogue only derivatively, in the sense that it 
depends on one's being able to represent an hypothetical 'other' with 
which to rehearse for dialogue. 24 There is also a sense in which some 
might be tempted to say that the 'dialogue' of reflective inquiry can 
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occur between an individual and some inanimate object within that 
individual's experience--say, a textbook. Yet, this is simply an 
individual's response to a culturally constructed and understood 
stimulus framed and communicated in terms of meanings which are already 
publicly shared. 
Because in both these instances there is a lack of mutual 
understanding and active engagement (to some degree or other) by all 
participants in the discussion, these two examples remain dialogues in a 
very attenuated and potentially misleading sense since the rest of the 
community is not actively participating. On the other hand, the 
activity of the physical scientist at her workbench is a dialogue in 
Dewey's sense to the degree that she is able to elicit from the 
materials she is testing a falsifiable 'response,' that is, a response 
which can be publicly understood and duplicated, and to which she and 
others in the community can respond in turn. 
Accordingly, genuine inquiry must meet the requirements of 
dialogue: (1) active engagement, (2) publicity, (3) an effort towards 
mutual understanding of and respect for differences, (4) openness to the 
inevitability of modification or change and (5) a willingness to allow 
ourselves, individually, to be led by the dynamic of the inquiry rather 
than by our own predetermined expectations and interests. As a 
deliberate and dynamic habit or practice in problem solving, reflective 
inquiry is social through and through and encompasses past, present and 
future. When Dewey considers moral inquiry, then, he associates these 
five characteristics with it as well, for then it is inquiry at its 
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best; it is the richest activity of intelligence at work; it is--to use 
the word Dewey often used for the purpose--science. 
Dewey's is a pluralistic philosophy that, in its characterization 
of the creative intelligence of individuals as a social process of 
deliberate, sustained and reflective inquiry, makes it possible to 
celebrate the diversity and difference in its participants as strengths 
rather than as weaknesses. Because his theory of inquiry rejects the 
alleged discontinuity between science and philosophy and emphasizes the 
multi-perspectival, pluralistic, fallibilistic and pragmatic character 
of creative intelligence wherever it operates, it is especially 
appropriate for addressing conflicts that arise in the field of health 
care. The present re-examination and critique of problematic 
patient/provider relationships and the effort to add to how they are 
described in the current health care literature presupposes and utilizes 
the central assumptions of Dewey's philosophical approach that have been 
explained here. 
Concluding Remarks: 
The Relevance of Dewey's Approach for this Dissertation 
The approach adopted in this dissertation is one that takes 
seriously Dewey's objections to the traditional philosophical approaches 
to the analysis of ethical problems in general and adapts his 
alternative philosophical methodology specifically to ethical issues in 
health care. It begins by accepting, right at the outset, the 
implications that follow from recognizing the actual situatedness of 
sentient, rational experience. While this approach appeals to many of 
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the same principles, rules, goals, values and virtues as the traditional 
approaches, these concepts are informed by a different set of 
presuppositions about the nature of persons. This different set of 
presuppositions acknowledges the interdependence that characterizes 
persons by incorporating into all discussion and deliberation the 
dynamic and fluid interrelationships between the complex and evolving 
environmental, biological, psychological and social aspects of sentient, 
rational existence. 
Within this alternative approach concepts such as autonomy--whether 
they are taken to be principles, values or virtues--have no apriori 
essence or standing. Rather, they are treated as encrypted 
generalizations culled from the distilled wisdom of past experiences--an 
individual's own and others--having, as yet, ambiguous meaning for the 
people involved and the particular situation at hand. They represent 
ways in which the meanings of similar problems in the past have been 
expressed and/or addressed. Like basic recipes, they are versatile 
tools that help us to produce novel creations and variations depending 
upon the ingredients at hand. 
The approach espoused in this work is a process whereby differing 
perspectives concerning a situation are, through the interreactive 
communication of dialogue, sought out and encouraged. Each alternative 
is subjected to what Dewey often referred to as 'dramatic rehearsal,' 
the equivalent of thought-experiments in science, wherein the 
antecedents and consequents of a indeterminate situation are 
imaginatively envisioned from a number of different perspectives and 
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critically examined so that the tentative results obtained might be 
integrated into current communication and debate. Analogous to the 
improvement binocular vision offers over monocular vision, the benefit 
of being able to view a situation from more than one perspective lies in 
its clarity in making accessible to us the requisite contrasts and 
comparisons needed in order to assess the significance of the 
interrelationships with a given situational field. 
This activity of comparison and contrast is, in turn, somewhat 
analogous to the movements one makes in bringing a microscope into 
focus: the barrel of the microscope is wheeled up and down in 
progressively smaller ranges until the specimen on a slide is brought 
into the sharpest focus. Similarly, as elements of the indeterminate 
situation are brought into focus--become more determinate--tentative 
hypotheses are developed from the elements of the situation itself, 
alternative solutions are imaginatively tested and possible consequences 
compared and evaluated. As the process continues all of the elements of 
the situation are funded with meaning, including the principles of 
action that guide further responses to the situation and the 
consequences of its resolution. As a result, an indeterminate situation 
becomes more determinate. 
Thus, this alternative approach differs both in its emphasis on 
interdependence as a characteristic rather than a defect of persons and 
in its adoption of a method of inquiry that is better equipped to 
explain these dynamic interrelationships. Consistent with its emphasis 
on interdependence, this approach relies upon the provision of an 
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environment that is conducive to communication and discussion, since it 
requires an opening, as it were, within which a meaningful story can 
develop out of a problematic situation that is fraught with 
indeterminancy. 
Before an assessment of this alternative approach can be 
undertaken, however, both the presuppositions about persons and 
relationships underlying the traditional approaches and the four 
principles that these presuppositions inform (namely, autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice), need to be reconstructed. 
That is the focus of chapter four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RE-ASSESSING SOME TRADITIONAL PRESUPPOSITIONS ABOUT PERSONS 
Of Persons and Patients: Concepts and Experience 
While there are a number of ways in which ethical issues between 
patients and health care providers can be discussed and analysed, 
persons remain the primary unit of moral reference and, thus, the 
central feature of such discourse. The focus of this chapter is to 
examine some prevalent presuppositions about persons that shape and are 
shaped by the set of concepts (especially autonomy and beneficence, but 
indirectly non-maleficence and justice as well) that are relied upon so 
prominently in standard approaches to health care ethics analysis today. 
The importance, ranking and use of these concepts--whether, for 
example, they are treated primarily as abstract principles or as 
concrete values--depends largely on the particular philosophical 
approach in question. But, irrespective of approach, the utilization of 
some variation of this set of concepts is central to most contemporary 
discussions, especially in health care ethics, concerning how to 
identify and to protect or to restore what are considered to be 
definitive characteristics of persons. By examining how these 
characteristics are expressed and reinforced in habitual behavior, our 
presuppositions about what it is to be a person can be identified and 
subjected to further inquiry. 
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The next several sections discuss problems associated with 
conceptualizing these characteristics when the concepts used to do so 
are not fine-grained enough to do the work asked of them because of 
insufficiently critical presuppositions about persons upon which they 
are based. The perspectives explained in chapter three, drawn from the 
work of John Dewey, will be especially useful in unpacking the errors of 
these presuppositions and how they affect the standard health care 
ethics approach. 
A Caution About Concepts 
A concept is generally construed as the product of an attempt to 
capture and to fix in an abstract and non-dynamic form certain generic 
aspects of a complex, concrete experience which is fluid and dynamic. 
When considered alone, bereft of context, this non-dynamic form can 
serve only as a reminder of the potential that an experience can have 
for a person, depending on antecedent conditions (which include the 
distilled wisdom learned from past experiences--our own, but especially 
that communicated to us by others), present context and the availability 
of the means necessary for realizing those possibilities. 
Until the material conditions of the particular story or case it is 
connected with are identified, the meaning of a concept will retain a 
certain openness which gives it its characteristic ambiguity. When a 
situation is read in terms of some favored or pre-determined 
understanding of such a concept, that open range of possibilities can be 
prematurely closed and the possibility of a mismatch between concept and 
reality increases. When this happens, our understanding of a situation 
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can actually become more rather than less indeterminate. 
Concepts are important tools that can function very well as 
effective pieces of intellectual short-hand. However, it is possible 
for a concept, like any tool, to obfuscate as well as to clarify an 
already indeterminate situation. The meaning of any concept cannot be 
given once and for all because its context is never given once and for 
all. That is, the meaning of a concept changes as the bio/psycho/social 
field within which it functions and is framed changes. Whenever aspects 
of an existence that is inherently characterized by change are isolated 
and fixed by externally pre-established concepts--whether these have 
been formulated as principles, rules, criteria, values or virtues--there 
is an element of risk involved. These concepts can distort our 
understanding of an experience by artificially isolating and fixing upon 
certain aspects of an existence that is, in reality, both more complex 
and inherently characterized by change. 
The difficulty is exacerbated if we allow ourselves to assume the 
adequacy of and to be guided by a single pre-interpreted perspective in 
the attempt to make sense of unexpected hitches in our complex and 
evolving interrelationships, experiences that are marked by periods of 
disruption as well as periods of dynamic and homeostatic balance. To 
the degree that we uncritically accept and act from such a perspective 
we eliminate, without adequate reason, certain points of view and, in 
turn, certain possible meanings of and alternative resolutions for an 
indeterminate situation. This is why what are today called 
'principlist' approaches--i.e., ones that analyse indeterminate 
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situations by applying concepts externally pre-established from a 
particular pre-existing perspective--are·so problematic. The discussion 
of health care ethics that issues from today's standard perspective, as 
exemplified in chapter two, suffers from just this problem. 
The Myth of The Independent Agent 
One of the central tenets of the standard approach to health care 
ethics being examined here is the belief that a person's autonomy is 
compromised by illness. This belief is based on the fact that, when 
functionally-compromised by injury or illness, a person becomes more 
dependent on others. According to this approach, this reduction in a 
person's ordinary functioning is said to contribute to a reduction in 
her autonomy. 
Now, it is fairly straight-forward and uncontroversial that, as 
illness decreases a person's ability to function, it increases that 
person's dependence upon others. Unfortunately, what too often occurs 
within the standard approach is that dependence itself, rather than its 
relative increase or decrease, is set in opposition to autonomy. This 
reinforces a presumption that persons are not normally dependent but, 
rather, complete and self-contained entities that exist independently 
from the rest of their environment unless or until they become 
functionally compromised. 
Closely connected to this presumption is the belief that, under 
ordinary conditions, persons control whether and how their lives will 
affect and be affected by others. As a result, autonomy comes to be 
treated as the 'default mode' of human existence and is defined in terms 
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of atomistic isolation: persons are self-defining, self-sufficient and 
completely self-determined. In this default mode, justice is 
represented primarily in negative terms, such as non-interference and 
non-maleficence; and any role that beneficence might have is limited to 
those exceptional circumstances when such an atomistic view of persons 
either has been or is in danger of being compromised. In short, 
autonomy is held in stark opposition to dependency of any sort and the 
cooperative interdependence required in actual living--if the autonomy 
that persons are actually capable of is to develop and flourish--is 
ignored. 
But there is no such necessary one-to-one connection in real life 
between autonomy and independence. Respecting a person as an autonomous 
being actually requires taking into account an interdependence of the 
very sort ignored by this atomistic interpretation of autonomy. 
Interdependence need not be viewed as a defect, even when it is 
increased or modified as a result of illness or injury; it is already a 
fundamental fact of human existence. As Dewey put it: 
The idea of a natural individual in his isolation possessed of 
full-fledged wants, of energies to be expended according to his own 
volition, and of a ready-made faculty of foresight and prudent 
calculation is as much a fiction in psychology as the doctrine of 
the individual in possession of antecedent political rights is one 
in politics. 1 
In other words, a person does not exist in a ready-made form that can be 
disembodied or disembedded from all context. A person participates in 
and evolves within a dynamic and continuous field of complex 
interreactions. 
Therefore, when the standard approach to health care ethics narrows 
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its view of autonomy to total independence, it necessarily misses many 
important features of the issues it examines, as the re-examination of 
chapter two's cases in chapter five will make clear. 
Zoe and Bios 
In order to understand why the concepts we use to talk about 
persons are especially problematic--a difficulty that is wide-spread, 
but especially problematic for the standard approach--it will be helpful 
to look at our English word, 'life.' As it is used in English it is a 
particularly ambiguous concept because it does not distinguish between 
'being alive' and 'having a life. 12 In Greek, there are two words, zoe 
and bias, used to refer to the concept known in English as 'life.' Zoe 
is life in a biological sense, i.e., 'being alive.' Zoe provides the 
basis of our word, zoology, the biological science of animals. 
Bias, on the other hand, is life in a bio/psycho/social sense, 
i.e., 'having a life.' Bios is the basis of our word, biography, a 
written history of a person. 3 Bios presupposes zoe insofar as to have a 
life, one must be alive. But zoe (being alive) does not guarantee bios 
(having a life), it merely provides the biochemical substrate for its 
possibility. Bios--having a life--means being a reflective subject of a 
life. That is, having a life entails sufficient consciousness--at 
minimum, a rudimentary sentience and memory--to recognize self and 
environment, to appreciate how they are interconnected, and to effect a 
delicate balance of those interconnections through the ability to reason 
about means and ends. 
Persons, in addition to being alive, are also rightly said to 
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possess that life. A person is the subject, the agent/patient as it 
were, of a particular life, with a particular history, within a 
particular dynamic and holistic set of environing conditions and 
experiences--environmental, biological, psychological and social. 
Persons actively undergo life in the sense of bios; because they are 
able to reflect upon experiences--both direct and vicarious ones--they 
can learn to modify experience as well as their responses to it by 
becoming active participants rather than merely passive recipients. 
This is why bios cannot be reduced to or explained solely in terms of 
zoe. 
The implications of this distinction for health care are especially 
profound since the zoe-istic or biological aspects of life cannot take 
account of the role that the psycho/social elements characteristic of 
having a life play in constituting persons. Without concepts in 
discourse that distinguish clearly between being alive and having a 
life, it is difficult to avoid a mechanistic view of persons that sees 
them as discrete and self-contained objects that merely react to other 
objects in their environment, and to adopt, instead, a holistic view of 
persons as reflective subjects of lives who are constantly redefining 
and being redefined by their participation in a dynamic and homeostatic 
interrelationship with an environment. The term, 'homeostasis,' is used 
here to express the fluid and dynamic nature of both the elements that 
are interreacting and the activity of balancing those elements so as to 
optimize one's existence within and with an environment. 
This failure of the standard approach to sufficiently distinguish 
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between being alive and having a life also reinforces what, in the 
culture of the United States, is already an overly atomistic 
interpretation of persons that, in turn, influences the way other 
concepts central to ethical discourse in health care are treated. In 
order to answer questions about what constitutes treating persons who 
are patients with respect, the factors that must be taken into account 
and addressed regarding persons are not those belonging to zoe, but to 
bias. So, by adopting this distinction between having a life and being 
alive, we could more readily focus upon what is distinctive about 
persons and articulate a much richer understanding of the concepts 
associated with that distinctiveness. 
Unfortunately, the standard approach to health care ethics today is 
as narrow in its conception of life as it is in its conception of 
autonomy/independence. The distinction articulated here in terms of zoe 
and bias plays little role in the analysis of cases according to the 
standard approach, as the examples in chapter two demonstrate. When 
these cases are re-examined in chapter five, the implications of 
distinguishing between being alive and having a life will be developed 
in more concrete detail. In the next section, an examination of John 
Dewey's analysis of organisms in relationship to their environments will 
contribute to this discussion. 
An Alternative Set of Presuppositions About Persons 
Based on the Concept of Bias 
In his discussion of the reciprocal interaction between a living 
organism and its equally complex and dynamic environment, Dewey 
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discusses how organisms become individuated and why the integrity of the 
organism/environment interrelationship is a critical material condition 
for the integrity of the organism itself. 4 Such a holistic way of 
conceptualizing an organism not only emphasizes the elemental and 
dynamic homeostatic interrelationship between every organism--not only 
the human organism--and its environment. It also reflects how complexly 
and inextricably organisms--especially human organisms--are mutually 
bound to one another and to the environment they share. In fact, the 
interdependence between organism and environment is so profound that the 
organism is literally indefinable and incomprehensible when isolated 
from that environment: 
The processes of living are enacted by the environment as truly as 
by the organism; for they ~r~ an integration .... [It is not simply] 
that a fish lives in the water and a bird in the air, but that the 
characteristic functions of these animals are what they are because 
of the special way in which water and air enter into their 
respective activities. 5 
Similarly, the characteristic functions of the intelligent organisms we 
call persons are what they are because of the special way in which 
environment enters into the activities of persons. On this account, 
what a person's basic needs and interests are and how they might be met 
are bio/psycho/social constructs insofar as they are a mutual evolution 
of organism and environment. 6 Persons, when considered in total 
isolation from the environment within which they pursue the activities 
connected to their having a life, are also quite literally indefinable 
and incomprehensible. 
One implication of this evolutionary interrelationship is that it 
is profoundly irrational for persons, in the course of satisfying their 
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own basic needs and interests, to act from the belief that they must 
consider themselves in opposition either to each other or to their 
environment. Both organism and environment mutually participate in and 
contribute to the determination of the organism's basic needs and 
interests; therefore, if individual persons are to flourish {i.e., if 
they are to have a life, if they are to have their basic needs and 
interests met, if they are to benefit from their participation in a part 
of a bio/psycho/social existence), their integrity cannot be purchased, 
either routinely or for very long, but only briefly and superficially, 
at the expense of disrupting the integrity of the rest of the 
environment of which they are a part. In this sense, it is quite 
correct to say that the flourishing of the individual entails the 
flourishing of the whole. The contrast between this conception of 
persons and that presupposed by the standard approach, especially in its 
appeals to its particular notion of autonomy, is significant. 
Consequently, an important part of what it means for persons to 
maintain a homeostatic balance within an environment includes their 
realization that, in satisfying their needs and interests, they must do 
so in such a way that the integrity of the organism/environment 
interrelationship is respected. This presupposes that persons, as 
intelligent organisms, are capable of understanding and acting in a 
manner consistent with this fact, namely, that their own well-being and 
flourishing depends on preserving and enhancing the delicate balance of 
all organism/environment interrelationships. More specifically, since 
persons' needs and interests are so heavily influenced by and bound up 
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with the social aspects of their environment, persons must understand 
that the satisfaction of their needs and interests depends upon, in 
fact, can only be a consequence of, an irreducible and dynamic 
connection between individuals. The atomic individual idealized in the 
standard account of autonomy is a fiction, and is capable of profoundly 
disrupting persons in their quest to meet their needs and interests. 
Thus, for one person to have a life in any relevant sense (bios) 
requires the existence and involvement of others who can also recognize, 
value (even if only potentially or vicariously) and, in some situations, 
creatively participate in that life. No matter how self-directed or 
self-sufficient individuals do become, and ought to become in 
actualizing their potentialities, a whole community of others will have 
had, and will continue to have, a hand in both the development and the 
continued flourishing of every individual. 
Moreover, it is important to understand here that it is not simply 
intimate personal others who have a hand in this activity, but all 
others--even those never personally known to the individual--who 
publicly and privately participate in the creation of that community--
which is made up myriad kinds of particular relationships, associations 
and comrnunities--of others. That is, a community of persons is the 
function of persons interreacting with, and by means of, each other and 
their surrounding environment. The resulting character of that 
community affects and is affected by every person's interreactions. In 
short, individuals need a complex, many-faceted nurturing community to 
help them develop their own unique capacities and talents. Communities, 
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moreover, if they are to flourish and to interreact with individuals in 
this way, in turn need individuals who are motivated to reciprocate such 
nurturing and care in their own unique ways. 
Thus Dewey's account of the reciprocal and dynamic interdependence 
that exists between organism and environment and his description of how 
that interdependence modifies the development and capacities of both 
organism and environment provides an alternative way of understanding 
ourselves as persons and of understanding, therefore, the nature of our 
obligations to one another. Each person has a unique biography; but it 
is one which others have played, and continue to play, an integral part 
in creating, nurturing and protecting. In other words, I am the person 
I am because of contributions others have made towards satisfying my 
basic needs and helping to develop my particular talents and interests; 
and these contributions began long before I was capable of recognizing 
self from non-self. 
In addition, the satisfaction of basic needs and the assistance 
given me in developing my particular talents and interests are things I 
neither contracted for nor solicited from others--irrespective of 
whether I could or would have. The notion, so common in contemporary 
discussions of autonomy, that contract precedes social interaction is as 
false as that of the atomic individual. A significant portion of the 
conditions of my existence have been and continue to be outside of me 
and, yet, are also intimately bound up in my self-identity. That other 
persons routinely and without being expressly solicited have, for 
example, prevented or relieved my suffering from unmet basic needs is 
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indicative of the fact that I am valued--for whatever diverse reasons. 
To the extent that I am who I am rests on the fact that I have been 
valued in this manner, I cannot even begin to describe myself in terms 
that exclude this fundamental interrelationship with others. 
My understanding of myself and my expression of my own value may be 
distinguished from, but it cannot be separated from this complex 
bio/psycho/social interdependence between myself and my environment. To 
the degree that I am sentient and rational, these facts will therefore 
command my attention and demand an accounting, since a central feature 
of what it is to be sentient and rational is the ability to reflect 
critically about (i.e., to make sense of) one's situation. Another common 
falsification of our situation is that autonomous individuals reflect 
first alone and only later bring their reflections to others. But in 
point of fact, such reflection includes the process of asking and giving 
reasons--a process that itself presupposes community rather than 
isolation. 
Moreover, it is only in comprehending my existential situation as 
one of fundamental interdependence that the origin and reciprocal 
character of such notions as debt, gratitude, trust, sympathy, empathy, 
responsibility and obligation begin to unfold and become determinate. 
This interdependence implies that obligation and, in turn, other 
concepts through which obligation is expressed (e.g., autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice) must be understood not as 
duties imposed on persons from without, but as intrinsic elements that 
belong to having a life. That is, interdependence and obligation are no 
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different from any other concepts insofar as they are the attempts of 
persons to make explicit the meanings of the norms that are implicit in 
the social practices they participate in and within which they are 
already immersed. 
These particular concepts are generated as a result of the myriad 
inferences persons make and tacitly share about their mutual situation. 
Because of the way in which they are generated, concepts cannot possibly 
have a meaningful existence outside of the 'having' of a life, outside 
of an experience that is thoroughly bio/psycho/social. Concepts are 
neither derived nor imposed from without; they represent the explicit 
working out of what is already implicit in a dynamic and complexly 
evolving bio/psycho/social existence. 
Autonomy as a Bio/psycho/social Concept 
On this reconstructed view of persons, autonomy can no longer be 
viewed as the ideal independence of an isolated, individual self. 
Instead our notions of self-rule, self-control, self-determination, 
self-governance, freedom, liberty, choice must all be taken to refer to 
an individual self that is neither simply a finished product of 
organism/environment interaction nor some disembedded, implacable and 
disinterested spectator but, in fact, a person that has unique and 
distinctive traits by reason of being an entity capable of intelligence 
and embedded in a dynamic organism/environment field in process. 
Autonomy, on this reconstructed view, comes to signify much the same 
thing as Dewey spoke of as 'freedom': 
a distinctive way of behaving in conjunction and connection with 
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other distinctive ways of actin~, not a self-enclosed way of acting 
independent of everything else. 
It is simply impossible for the result of an individual person's 
proper growth and development to be 'autonomous' in the sense 
presupposed by the standard approach, i.e., completely self-reliant and 
isolated from the influence of others. Rather, the stability and self-
possession associated with the functions so highly prized by persons as 
being a part of what they consider autonomy to be can, in fact, occur 
only within a particular kind of environment, one of nurturing and care, 
a milieu characterized by the existence of already complex cooperative 
interrelationships and practices, both tacit and explicit, and both 
spontaneous collaborative activities and carefully organized and 
structured practices having a long history of development in their own 
right. None of our experiences and none of our reflections about them 
occur in a vacuum; they are always understood in terms of various 
relationships, associations, communities and, inevitably, cultural 
perspectives. Therefore, even when a person has an experience when no 
one else is present, her experiencing and her understanding of it are 
imbued with and filtered through communal frameworks. 
Hence, an obligation to respect a person's autonomy requires more 
than a formal, abstract recognition that individuals, by virtue of being 
persons, have a right to make their own decisions; i.e., ought to be, in 
some sense, left alone, unhampered. It also requires an appreciation of 
the role that a person's numerous connections to her community play in 
determining how effectively she will be able to realize that autonomy 
as, for example, in actualizing her capacity for decision-making. 
93 
This is why doing nothing more than formally recognizing the 
abstract legal rights of persons who have suffered, for example, racial 
or sexual discrimination is not simply ineffectual but often 
counterproductive. It is why concrete measures must also be introduced 
to redress inequities existing in both formal social institutions and 
informal social practices that have been ingrained by past 
insensitivities, as well as the long-term effects of these on the 
individual and collective psyches. It may be, relatively speaking, a 
straight-forward process to change the policies of a political 
institution. It takes far longer to change the effects that the 
political enculturation of a policy has had on the daily lives of 
persons, because such a change must address causal processes in the 
formation of persons, identities, concepts and behaviors that are far 
more complex, but just as important. 
So, to respect formal autonomy without, for example, securing 
equitable access to the effective means of its realization--i.e., 
without making it a lived experience for all persons--fails to respect 
persons precisely because it ignores the interdependent play of 
bio/psycho/social antecedents and consequents that determines in actual 
practice what autonomy will effectively amount to for persons. Just as 
the ability to distinguish self from non-self emerges slowly as a person 
begins to experience having a life--thanks to, among other factors, the 
assistance and support of others who provide a safe space within which 
to develop those experiences--so effectively expressing and maximally 
benefitting from genuinely autonomous behavior develops in the context 
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of intelligent (i.e., critical and reflective) interreactions between 
persons. Obviously, a health care ethics--or a system of ethics of any 
sort--that is built on a concept of autonomy that ignores these 
realities about what it is to be a person will overlook much of ethical 
significance. 
Beneficence and Non-Maleficence as Bio/psycho/social Concepts 
On the view espoused by the standard approach to health care ethics 
examined earlier in chapter two, beneficence and non-maleficence are 
regarded as principles that regulate conduct towards persons as isolated 
subjects deserving of 'respect,' a notion that, in turn, is based on an 
inexplicit and quite narrow intuition as to the characteristics of 
personhood. On the reconstructed view of persons as bio/psycho/social 
entities, beneficence and non-maleficence cannot be regarded simply as 
forms of substituted autonomy, with 'autonomy' referring to the 
decisions and actions of isolated, individual selves. Something much 
richer and, in terms of obligations and relationships, something much 
more complex is needed. 
Clearly, persons cannot begin to develop their individual talents 
and characters--much less contribute or participate in a common life--
without the beneficence and non-maleficence of others. But this is only 
to re-iterate that persons begin as completely helpless selves, unable 
to survive without a community of others willing and able to protect 
them from harm and suffering, to provide for their basic needs and to 
act as their mentors.a 
Parenthetically, the term, 'mentor,' has specifically been chosen 
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here as a contrast to the usual structured educative relationships in 
which teachers actively convey information that learners relatively 
passively absorb. Learning (both formal and informal) is too often 
viewed as a one-way process, from teacher to learner, and where the 
purpose of having the learner respond is primarily to verify that the 
information has been absorbed. But in such a process, students do not 
learn how to think but only, if anything, what to think--which is then 
treated as a set of facts or as the product of someone else's inquiries. 
In mentoring, as the term is used here, all parties are actively 
engaged; all contribute to the process, which is not confined to a 
particular time, place or structure. 
Consequently, in mentoring everyone is both teacher and learner 
and, in the communication that results, listening becomes the 
quintessential feature of the process. Such 'listening' involves more 
than simply a passive registering of isolated facts communicated by 
another; rather, it requires of the listener the curiosity and 
imagination to set aside his own particular situation and perspective 
and to enter into the situation and perspective of the speaker, 
representing her perspective with as much fidelity as possible. A very 
important part of decision-making involves learning how to represent 
alternatives with charity and fidelity. 
Even after persons have developed sufficiently to exhibit 
decisional capacity or, further, to be considered legally competent, 
they remain immersed and continue to participate in, by means of and 
with an environment that is interdependent through and through. Unless 
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a person's life is suddenly and unexpectedly cut short, it is ordinarily 
the case that, as persons age, their dependence upon others--to help 
them meet those basic needs necessary for them to continue to carry out 
their routine daily affairs, to pursue their life plans and goals and to 
participate in and with the environment they share--will eventually, 
once again, increase. 
But, perhaps most importantly, beneficence and non-maleficence can 
no longer be treated as attitudes and activities directed solely towards 
others. Certainly, this is not to deny the importance of being 
sensitive to or concerned about the good of others or their potential 
harm. Rather, it marks the fact that behaving beneficently or non-
maleficently makes us feel alive and in control of our own lives: we are 
most likely to discover who we are--sometimes to our dismay--during 
those interreactions where our interests and concerns are directed 
towards others. This discovery is a characteristic feature of persons; 
it is one of the fulfillments of potential that, through critical 
reflection, self-assessment, and personal growth and development, 
persons are capable of realizing. 
Since, as with any interreactions that involve persons, the 
responses of the social environment to a person's behavior will play an 
important role in the development of the person whose behavior it is, 
feedback (non-verbal as well as verbal) communicated by others will 
reinforce the development of attitudes and patterns of behavior that 
eventually come to characterize a person's unique sense of self. When 
guided by thoughtful and whole-hearted critical reflection, this 
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feedback between persons (whether intimates or complete strangers) 
constitutes a life-long, reciprocal mentoring process of listening, 
communication and growth, a process necessary for the perpetuation of 
persons as individuals who are members of various forms of community, a 
process not unlike Dewey's notion of democracy: 
that form of social organization, extending to all the areas and 
ways of living, in which the powers of individuals shall not be 
merely released from mechanical external constraint but shall be 
fed, sustained and directed. 9 
In other words, the transformation of examples of beneficent and non-
maleficent behavior (just like the transformation of examples of 
autonomous or just behavior) into free-standing principles to be applied 
to a problematic situation does not improve the human condition, but 
merely substitutes a "new kind of enslavement," 10 one that restricts the 
development of intelligent inquiry, discussion and expression to a pre-
determined path. As alluded to in chapter two, principles ought to be 
regarded not as restrictions, but as tools, suggested by past conditions 
and regarded as potential means for addressing current conditions. 
Obviously, a health care ethics--or an ethical system of any sort--that 
is built on concepts of beneficence and non-maleficence that are 
regarded solely (or, at least, predominantly) as externally-applied 
principles that stipulate practice ignores the realities and seriously 
underestimates the potentialities of our lived experience. Chapter five 
will examine the cases presented in chapter two from this reconstructed 
view of beneficence and non-maleficence. 
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Justice as a Bio/psycho/social Concept 
There is an ancient Chinese parable that describes heaven and hell 
as being precisely the same: each is a huge banquet with sumptuous foods 
placed on round tables. Each person is seated at one of the round 
tables and given a pair of chopsticks five feet long. In hell, everyone 
struggles in isolation trying to eat with his own set of chopsticks and 
eventually starves to death. In heaven, everyone uses his own set of 
chopsticks to serve the person directly across the table from him and no 
one goes hungry. 
According to the parable, heaven and hell will not be different 
from the rest of our experiences: they will be what we choose--and/or 
are led--to make of them. If each person assumes the habit of treating 
experiences as phenomena that are undergone privately and as the 
property of an isolated individual self, then developing solutions to 
problems that are experienced becomes the responsibility of the lone 
experiencer. On this view, whether individuals seek external 
consultation with others or not, they are expected and expect themselves 
to solve 'their own' problems; as a result, the possibilities that the 
transformative effects of interdependent and cooperative action can have 
on both means and ends will remain hidden from view and, thus, 
undeveloped. 
According to conceptions of justice that presuppose persons to be 
isolated units of self-determination, then, the persons in hell were 
treated equally and the persons in heaven were treated equally, so both 
situations are equally just. The effectiveness of the parable lies in 
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its identification of such a conception of equality with hell rather 
than heaven, because it ignores important bio/psycho/social aspects 
central to being a person, which includes having a life that is 
simultaneously characterized by dependence upon and responsibility for 
others. 
On the reconstructed view of persons as bio/psycho/social entities 
being proposed here, however, the idea of justice is not easily captured 
by its usual formal expression as the principle that equals are to be 
treated equally, for the view of persons being defended here makes much 
of the fact that individuals have unique strengths and weaknesses. When 
entities, because of their particular interrelationships with their 
environments, have developed unique characteristics, there is an 
important sense in which simply treating them equally falls short of 
recognizing them for what they are. 
Nor is the idea of justice more clearly captured by its usual 
material (as opposed to formal) expression, i.e., that treatment or 
distribution is to be equal unless morally decisive reasons can be given 
for unequal treatment or distribution--at least not until the historical 
context of the social antecedents that determines the bases for 
distribution is clearly understood and accepted as reasonable and fair. 
For example, the original intent of public education was to distribute 
social goods (in this instance, information and knowledgeable teachers) 
equally. However, when the bulk of funding for each public school site 
is tied to the revenues generated by the real estate taxes in that 
particular district, the resulting discrepancy in funding that develops 
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between rich and poor sections of a community is anything but equal. 
Yet, everyone in the poor districts is treated equally (badly) and 
everyone in the rich districts is treated equally. In other words, our 
concept of justice is deeply dependent on the concept of person upon 
which it is built, and inadequacies in the latter carry over directly as 
inadequacies in the former. 
The Chinese parable captures an important aspect of justice that 
the conceptions employed in the standard approach ('conceptions' because 
there are a variety of formulations employed within the approach, all 
resting on the same set of presuppositions) either miss or consider 
peripheral to its central features: the possibility of solidarity. On 
the view being proposed here, seeking justice for oneself must begin 
with being sensitive to one's interrelationships with one's 
environmental field and, especially, to the needs of others, since it is 
in the mutually defining features of this fundamental interrelationship 
that the notion of justice gains concrete substance. However, this can 
occur only through communication and participation of persons in 
unhampered, thoughtful and intelligently directed inquiry. The thrust of 
such an inquiry is to determine what they, as a community of sentient, 
rational beings with unique perspectives to offer, would collaboratively 
choose as a reasonable solution to their common problem, given the 
possibilities available to them due to the constraints of their 
particular context. 
A health care ethics--or a system of ethics of any kind--that 
regards justice solely as a formal principle, that stipulates only what 
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is owed persons by virtue of their status as autonomous individuals, 
ignores a central fact: that what counts as justice is neither timeless 
nor axiomatic, but an attempt to make explicit the implicit norms of our 
common, and frequently conflicting expectations and actual practices 
through intelligent inquiry, which includes the social practice of 
asking and giving reasons. In chapter five, the cases discussed in 
chapter two will be re-examined from this reconstructed view of justice. 
Characterizing The Ethical Through Bio/psycho/social Context 
Throughout this work, I have implicitly and explicitly appealed to 
context as elemental for understanding the origin and nature of ethical 
obligation between persons. There is nothing novel to this appeal, per 
se. Certainly, an integral part of modern medical inquiry has always 
been the individual patient's story. Diagnosis requires not only 
specialized theoretical knowledge and general expertise, but a specific 
patient's story. Thus, there is something important that the field of 
health care has provided the field of ethics: an understanding of the 
importance of performing, as it were, ethical diagnoses and ethical 
autopsies--an emphasis in assessing alternative approaches to ethical 
inquiry that attends better to the particular and concrete in 
problematic cases by means of stories--negative as well as positive 
ones. 
The patient's story--like every story--is the product of an 
intersubjective process and has an objective status in the sense that it 
is as real as the patient whose story it is. Included in that story is 
a history, a physical, a differential diagnosis, a set of possible 
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prognoses (from best- to worst-case scenarios) and a range of treatment 
alternatives. The patient evolves and narrates a history. This 
personal history is corroborated or refuted by family, friends and 
physical findings. The very fact that such a history can come together 
about a person and can be communicated and argued about is itself yet 
another example of the bio/psycho/social context of ethical reflection. 
In the health care setting, the physicians' and other care-givers' 
observations and examinations of and their interactions with the patient 
generate physical findings. The care-givers' assessment of the physical 
findings and their own specialized knowledge and expertise, in 
conjunction with the patient's history, generates a diagnosis and a 
prognosis. The range of treatment alternatives is a joint production of 
care-givers (based on their expertise) and social institutions (based on 
their responsibility for deciding which goods and services will be made 
available for distribution and how they will be distributed). At every 
point along the way, there is (ideally) a process of collaboration and 
negotiation between care-givers and patient (or her designated 
representative) that facilitates the resolution of the problematic 
aspects of the story without closing its consequences off to further re-
assessment. 
It comes as no great surprise that 'telling a story' is so very 
successful as a method of ethical education and development for persons 
from childhood on up. For the great stories of our cultural heritages 
provide descriptions of and commentaries on tacit as well as explicit 
communal frameworks within which occur the negotiation and development 
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of what come to be considered ethically significant features of 
experience. They provide a setting within which we can identify, 
compare, contrast, imaginatively test, evaluate and discuss what have 
come to be considered ideals, principles, values and virtues within our 
associations and communities--and to what purpose. 
Being confronted with, for example, the Greek tragedies challenges 
us as individuals to re-examine, set aside, defend or discard any 
particular point of view (whether personal or cultural) by forcing us 
imaginatively to experience the story from a multiplicity of often-times 
competing perspectives. Such stories enrich us in a way that fulfills 
our need "to see the world whole." They provide us with the 
opportunity, in a leisurely and safe setting, to pursue alternatives by 
imaginative rehearsal without actually suffering the consequences. In 
describing the immense value which great works of literature have for 
us, Lorraine Code eloquently reminds us: 
Novels may not give us moral knowledge directly and unequivocally, 
but they often show us ways of placing moral points of view in 
possible human situations. They illustrate some of the 
perplexities and implications of putting moral theories into 
practice so that one can see the importance of certain stances and 
understanding something of why they will or will not, should or 
should not work. 11 
The patient/care-giver relationship can be aptly viewed as a story 
that evolves out of multiple perspectives or points of view. Every step 
of the way in the development of the patient's story there are 
individuals and disciplines registering and communicating their 'take' 
on circumscribed aspects of the story. This notion of the narrative 
processing of events--the creative envisioning which occurs within the 
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context of one's knowledge and understanding of one's larger b10-psycho-
social possibilities--is, in large part, what makes it possible for 
persons to understand themselves as beings who have lives. 
In addition, attending to the narrative processing of events in any 
story forces us to recognize that having a point of view is an integral 
feature of having a life and to realize that others may have points of 
view that are startlingly different from our own. This is especially 
true in health care cases, where life and death issues are often so 
vividly drawn and contested. 
Taking a perspective different from one's own, seeing how it 
enhances or diminishes what one claims to value from one's own 
perspective, is at once humbling and enriching. But, more importantly, 
it is to engage in behavior that is characteristically ethical. It 
requires one to engage in representing perspectives other than one's own 
in the most charitable of terms possible while defending one's own 
perspective with the most compelling good reasons one can muster. Being 
able to see an issue from a multiplicity of perspectives is the 
intellectual tool by which all inquiries (ethical, scientific or 
otherwise) are progressively refined and advanced; but it is the 
reflective activity itself, the element of reflective inquiry or 
intelligence, that is most distinctively called 'moral.' 
According to Martha Nussbaum the real task of moral philosophy is 
"to make a fine artistic creation'' of the 'raw' material of 
experience. 12 This 'fine artistic creation' is at once a continuous 
process and product of persons. It is a bio/psycho/social activity 
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because it is the result of the dynamic interrelations between a certain 
kind of organism, a person, and its environment. While the 'artist' 
produces her 'product' in the first person singular, she is nevertheless 
an 'artist' only by virtue of being a participant in a set of 
intelligently constructed and directed social practices that occur 
within a particular physical environment. Between the artist, the 
artistic community and the wider community there is--both tacitly and 
explicitly--a continuous intellectual dialogue and narrative that 
reflects the negotiation involved in the very meaning of what it is to 
make 'a fine artistic creation.' So everyone who engages attentively in 
concrete moral reflection, Nussbaum is saying, is likewise striving to 
be an artist in this sense. 
Medicine is also an art--but it is an art predicated on the 
sciences. In our culture, a dichotomy between art and science is widely 
accepted; but, as chapter three explained, Dewey rejected such deep 
dichotomies between the varieties of reflective inquiry. Science, 
perceptively understood, is the result of the dynamic interrelations 
between a certain kind of organism and its environment, it is 
bio/psycho/social through and through. This is the reason, this one not 
yet well examined, that the scientific and artistic elements of medical 
practice are not at constant war, because their deepest roots are, 
ideally, one and the same. And this is also why ethical inquiry need 
not be at war with the scientific side of health care practice. 
Good outcomes in health care cannot be reduced to physiological 
statistics simply by virtue of the fact that treating patients 
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presupposes quantitative laboratory data; but a proper bio/psycho/social 
understanding of science offers no basis for such a reductive conclusion 
in the first place. Reflecting about ethical issues in health care 
encounters requires understanding pathophysiology, psychology and 
sociology; but this does not mean that ethics or philosophical 
reflection about it can be exhausted by, reduced to or passively read 
off of these sciences. 
Ethical reflection within the health care setting calls on 
scientists at work there to remember the bio/psycho/social grounds of 
their forms of reflective inquiry. In a parallel way, ethical analysis 
in the field of health care calls the fields of ethics and philosophy to 
remember that reflective inquiry--the sine qua non of ethics and 
philosophy--because it is a characteristic of persons, is a never-ending 
piecemeal project that represents the activity of a particular sort of 
organism's dynamic interreation with its environment. 
An approach to ethics which ignores these considerations is one 
which, in the real world, lacks flexibility and leads to premature 
closure: premature, not in the sense that all data necessary to a 
particular case's disposition have not been gathered and sufficiently 
scrutinized, but premature in the sense that the totality of the whole 
problem as it extends into the future can no longer be viewed 
dynamically. In other words, a 'solution' can become reified and made 
to serve as a fixed solution to future problems rather than as a 
springboard to further exploration of a complex and dynamic issue. When 
this occurs, principles such as autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence 
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and justice are treated as isolated set pieces to be externally applied 
to problems rather than as elements of on-going reflection already part 
of an indeterminate situation. 
Adopting a bio/psycho/social view of ethical reflection requires us 
to look at persons and their problems as part and parcel of a more 
extensive project. This project aims not at closure but at seeking to 
bring about a pragmatic 'end-in-view'--i.e., a temporary end that serves 
to deal with an immediate problem--as a means towards further reflective 
inquiry, learning and intellectual growth for the future. In such a 
view of ethical reflection, resolutions are means to further inquiry 
that will be made necessary by the dynamic bio/psycho/social network or 
field in which persons are embedded. That is, the persons, the data (of 
which principles and all the fruits of previous ethical reflection are 
but a part) and the environmental context (of which each community as it 
is at any given moment is a part) in which such problem-solving occurs 
are dynamically interactive. Even though the resolutions may, across 
cases at different times, be the same, problems are still not to be 
considered merely as challenges met, once and for all. 
The approach offered here looks at each problem and its resolution 
as always at once both ad hoc resolving of an indeterminancy and 
indicative of a larger challenge in progress which can only be 'met' in 
the same way: progressively. Such an approach is far more flexible and 
adaptive to the needs of persons as we actually find them because it 
allows for change, is open to the new data that the reflective life 
reveals and, therefore, actively seeks to re-examine prior decisions in 
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the light of changing circumstance. 
Describing the approach without solidifying it into an algorithm is 
challenging. Before saying any more about it--both for clarity's sake 
and because this is what the approach itself requires--the three cases 
examined in chapter two will now be re-examined. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RE-ASSESSING THE CASES PRESENTED IN CHAPTER TWO 
FROM A BIO/PSYCHO/SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE 
Introduction 
Besides the significant differences that will result from the 
reconstruction of personhood articulated in the preceding chapter, the 
alternative approach to case analysis offered here also differs in 
several respects from the one used to represent the standard approach in 
chapter two. This alternative also investigates the respective 
biological, psychological and social aspects of the cases. It does so 
by attempting to incorporate as many perspectives of the relationship as 
possible--in time (i.e., past, present and future) as well as in place 
(i.e., from the individual perspective of each person or designated 
representative). That is, this approach borrows the Socratic strategy 
of participatory discourse (without the metaphysical baggage of Platonic 
essentialism) described in chapter one, and has every one of the 
participants (or designated representatives) involved in the case ask 
and answer the three questions: "Where have you come from'?" "Where are 
you going'?" "How do we get there'?" 
This process (both the asking and the answering), is personal 
insofar as it is performed by each person who is party to the 
relationship. But it is also p_ublic insofar as communication renders it 
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accessible to and, thus, challengeable by all involved in the 
relationship. Somewhat similar to the manner in which Thomasma and 
Pellegrino make explicit the plurality of 'goods' involved in 
patient/provider encounters, 1 so this alternative approach attempts to 
render intelligible the even wider plurality of inexplicit, and 
oftentimes conflicting, interrelated interests that are involved in 
health care encounters. This is a crucial part of the approach, since 
it is only insofar as hidden, half-formed and, as yet, uncritically 
entertained intuitions are explicitly confronted and subjected to 
critical, public scrutiny that their coherence and consistency (or lack 
thereof) become evident. 
In other words, the process itself--as well as its potential means 
and ends--is also not simply open to collaborative inquiry, but requires 
it. Moreover, in addition, the alternative approach offered here relies 
on a strategy that differs from the the standard approach in that it 
tends to represent the issues of health care ethics cases as complex 
problems having a multiplicity of indeterminate features and 
ambiguities, whereas the standard approach often regards them as 
conflicts between a small number of competing, mutually exclusive 
solutions that are to be compared from some generic, disinterested 
perspective. Therefore, in this approach, much of the work of 
resolution in these cases depends upon the careful sorting out of a 
whole set of ancillary problems associated with how to proceed in the 
face of the indeterminate features and ambiguities of each particular 
case. 
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At this juncture, several things need to be stressed. First, the 
fact that it is impossible for all parties to an encounter to discover 
everything about each other's history does not mean that the attempt to 
do so is either misguided or futile. Persons cannot recognize, assess 
or appreciate each other's strengths, weaknesses, wants and needs simply 
by privately assuming things about one another; so they must consciously 
try to do so, even though their efforts are fallible and often 
incomplete. Second, critics of this alternative approach may complain 
that, in the real world, no one has time to make explicit all of the 
myriad assumptions persons have to make in order to get on with their 
daily lives. But if what is desired by persons is to have lives (bios, 
not merely zoe) and to address the indeterminacy of living and make life 
less indeterminate, then a critical part of accomplishing these things 
requires more of the kind of preventive strategic brainstorming 
characteristic of the participatory reflective inquiry espoused by this 
alternative approach. 
The first question, "Where have you come from'?" describes the 
biographical lives of the persons actively involved in a case. This 
bio/psycho/social history needs to be asked and answered as early as 
possible in the health care relationship; ideally, before problematic 
situations become crises. This question is crucial insofar as it allows 
the participants to anticipate the collaborative potential of the 
relationship, allowing more time to arrange for an alternative 
relationship that may better fit the expectations of those most 
intimately affected. 
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Moreover, since the biographies of those involved in the health 
care relationship do continue to evolve, the need to re-ask this first 
question can always arise. However, because it describes individual 
sets of fairly established personal habits and interests, the 
presumption is that the initial answers to this first question should 
not be subject to abrupt changes without reasons that can be articulated 
and understood even when they or their implications may be 
controversial. 
The second question, "Where are you going?" while shaped by history 
and present circumstance, anticipates the viability and future 
possibilities of the relationship by elucidating the goals, values and 
expectations of each of the participants to the relationship in light of 
the physical and technical limitations of the situation. In the event 
that any of the participants' goals, values or expectations cannot be 
reconciled by consensus or reasonable compromise, the second question 
illuminates the limitations--perhaps even the non-viability--of the 
relationship as heretofore conceived and the need for seeking an 
alternative. 
Moreover, as the membership of the relationship may change and the 
medical condition of the patient and the other personae will evolve over 
the course of time, so the answer to this second question will also 
evolve over time. Therefore, this question needs frequent re-asking and 
re-answering, especially whenever the patient's medical condition 
changes, but also simply whenever any of the participants to the 
relationship have reason to believe that a re-assessment is warranted. 
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The third question, "How do we get there?" presupposes that a great 
deal of the necessary consensus and compromise entailed by the 
constraints of the first two questions has already been accomplished. 
However, there is still much information to share, learn, discuss and 
re-assess on a continuing basis. So, how the third question is asked 
and answered will be prompted by and may, in turn, prompt re-assessment 
of the other two questions. 
This third question, because it deals predominantly with means, 
presupposes the explicit as well as tacit involvement of the larger 
community in ways that the first two questions do not, since the 
technology often required is largely created, controlled and allocated 
by the social institutions of the community. This serves as a reminder 
of the depth and intricacy of the bio/psycho/social interconnectedness 
of what in the past has been regarded as, and still is too often 
considered to be, a simple, dyadic patient/health care provider 
relationship. Even in the 'good old days,' this was an idealization 
rarely, if ever, actualized. As suggested in chapter one and argued 
from a Deweyan perspective in chapter three, a central characteristic of 
the process of intelligent inquiry, whether the subject matter is viewed 
as science or morals, is openness to the challenge of re-asking, re-
entertaining and re-answering these three questions at any point along 
the way. 
Before returning to the three cases analysed in chapter two, some 
further cautionary remarks are in order. First, to reduce overlap and 
undue repetition, those aspects of a case that remain unchanged from the 
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first analysis to the second will simply be assumed without explicit 
repetition. Those aspects that are substantially changed, however, will 
be clearly noted and their circumstances carefully established and 
addressed. 
Second, because we are not actually participants in these cases and 
do not actually enter into them as they progress--i.e., we are only 
thinking them through and not also undergoing them--these analyses 
cannot go beyond the level of imaginative rehearsal. That is, a central 
aspect of the reconstruction of these cases is missing: namely, the 
evolutionary modifications that develop in the course of the normal give 
and take of actual participation in a case resolution. However, given 
the empiricist constraints of the method of science, this is not a 
defect, but a characteristic of the enterprise. Until these prospective 
modifications actually occur and the breadth and depth of their effects 
can be measured, assessed, compared with customary practice and 
reviewed, there can be no hard evidence for or against their efficacy. 
Given the track record of the experimental sciences as examples of 
successful models of reflective inquiry, and so of this approach, one 
can reasonably anticipate that, whatever prospective and preventive 
strategies are used to resolve cases such as those examined here, if 
they are to be consistent with a bio/psycho/social approach, they will 
have to include critical scrutiny and revision of those social 
institutions associated with health care so as to make them more 
accessible and responsive to the persons they serve. 
For the convenience of the reader, each of the following re-
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analyses will be prefaced by the case as it was originally presented in 
chapter two. 
Case Analyses 
Case #1: The 'Rescue Medicine' Conundrum 
During a recent cold winter an indigent, elderly man was 
brought into a local emergency room with pneumonia. He was 
close to starvation and suffered from hypothermia because he 
could not afford to eat or heat his room after paying his 
rent. While in the emergency room, the man suffered a cardiac 
arrest. Three weeks after aggressive cardio-pulmonary 
resuscitation and stabilization, he remained completely 
unresponsive and totally dependent on a ventilator. During 
this time social services discovered that the man had no 
family or friends. The health care team suspected that the 
patient would remain permanently comatose, and a neurological 
consult confirmed the team's suspicion that the patient's 
prognosis was bleak. 
An ethicist was consulted to discuss whether it was 
ethically appropriate to discontinue this man's treatment and 
was told by the health care team that between $100,000 and 
$200,000 had been expended treating this man. The members of 
the health care team concurred that, had it been possible to 
restore the patient to a semblance of his pre-hospitalization 
condition (which it was not), they would have felt no qualms 
about continuing such treatment--which would have, in effect, 
returned this patient to the material conditions responsible 
for his hospitalization in the first place. 
Analysis 
The analysis of this case in chapter two ended with the health care 
team having decided to withdraw all of this patient's medical treatment 
with the exception of comfort measures. The reasoning behind this 
decision was based on the assumption that this patient would not wish to 
be sustained in a vegetative existence because most persons having the 
opportunity to decide this issue in advance would not choose to be 
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sustained in a vegetative state (which might explain the concern about 
comfort measures for a patient in a vegetative existence). On the basis 
of this assumption it was argued that the principles of autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice would best be served, and the 
values they represent best maximized by withdrawing all treatment except 
comfort measures. 
The account of individualism that is assumed in this reasoning and 
implied in the standard approach, includes the presupposition that 
respecting a person entails treating her--or, in this instance, him--as 
an isolated, atomistic locus of rational self-determination and self-
sufficiency. The rationale behind this account appears to be as 
follows: because certain characteristics are worthy of respect (e.g., 
rationality, self-determination, self-sufficiency), the class of 
entities having those characteristics are, in turn, worthy of respect. 
However, reliance on this account of individualism to justify treatment 
decisions for patients in circumstances like those of this case is not 
defensible since it is precisely these characteristics (along with 
others) of personhood that are missing or seriously compromised in this 
patient. Hence, this account of individualism cannot adequately make 
sense of the notion of ethical obligations in such a case. 
For an account of individualism to be considered adequate, it must 
take seriously the antecedent experiential context and conditions of 
personhood. That is, it must attend to the fact that the development of 
a person's distinctive features--those characteristics that make her who 
she is--is not the product of a lone, disinterested spectator, but a 
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continuous and dynamic bio/psycho/social process, an active, dynamic 
expression of that particular individual's interdependent relationships 
with her environment. The alternative approach advocated here espouses 
the alternative, reconstructed account of individualism and its 
implications. Among other things, it enables us to make sense of why we 
still feel the tug of ethical obligation to persons whose autonomy has 
been seriously compromised insofar as it grounds the notion of ethical 
obligation not in some independent criteria that define what it is to be 
a person, but in the bio/psycho/social matrix of that individual's 
existence as a person. 
In other words, when an individual, such as the patient in this 
case, permanently loses those characteristics that make it possible for 
him to have a life, the ethical alternatives of those others connected 
with his situation are not limited simply to speculating about what some 
generic person would want when he is no longer capable of appreciating 
his situation or making that choice. Rather, in the event that a 
patient cannot directly act or speak for himself, every attempt is made 
to reconstruct his particular perspective and then to represent it with 
as much accuracy and fidelity as possible. 
That is why the ethical obligations of those involved in caring for 
such a patient cannot be determined from applying a set of independently 
derived principles. Rather, every attempt must be made to reconstruct 
that particular patient's story--his bio/psycho/social history, his 
unique relationship with his environment. This alternative account of 
personhood, because it is committed to attempting such a reconstruction 
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of the person's perspective, makes it possible to talk coherently about 
ethical obligations to patients that, according to the standard 
approach's account of individualism, are no longer rational, self-
determined or self-sufficient. 
Taking the bio/psycho/social matrix of ethical obligation seriously 
also reinforces a particular kind of collaborative process that 
distinguishes this alternative approach from the standard approach in a 
very important respect; namely, it is a homeostatic collaborative 
process. That is to say, this process is not simply causal, nor simply 
reactive, but homeostatic, insofar as the dynamic balance sought in this 
particular kind of collaboration is one that promotes the integrity of 
the whole by protecting the integrity of each of the individual elements 
involved, and this includes the interrelationships that characterize 
those individual elements. 
Moreover, this homeostatic collaboration is guided by the Deweyan 
notion of 'intelligence;' namely, it meets those requirements of 
reflective inquiry discussed in chapter three: (1) active engagement, 
(2) publicity, (3) an effort towards mutual understanding of and respect 
for differences, (4) openness to the inevitability of modification or 
change and (5) a willingness to allow ourselves to be led by the dynamic 
of the inquiry rather than by pre-established interests and 
expectations. This notion of intelligence is quite different from a 
process in which pre-established principles are applied (however 
intelligently) algorithmically, analogous to how men are deployed 
against one another in a game of chess, until one side or the other is 
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victorious. 
If this alternative account of individualism were incorporated into 
ethical analyses of health care encounters, a corresponding change in 
the scope, structure and function of professional codes and formal 
statements about the primary goals and values of health care would also 
follow. The general focus of these formal ideals of health care 
practice would still be to benefit individual patients. However, 
because 'patient' and 'benefit' would be more broadly construed, from 
within a bio/psycho/social perspective, both theory and practice in 
health care would be significantly altered. 
In other words, because it enhances our understanding of how 
profoundly the antecedent conditions of our current environment 
(especially the social ones) influence what it is to be a person--to 
have a life--this alternative account would (1) enable finer 
distinctions to be drawn at the level of each particular case, (2) make 
it easier to translate formal statements into effective guides to action 
and (3) prompt the creation, interaction and evolution of the kinds of 
social structures that can anticipate as well as respond to cases such 
as this one. As a result, our social institutions will be better 
equipped to deal with such cases prospectively rather than merely 
anterospectively. 
Compare, for example, the items (listed on page 34) that are 
traditionally included in formal statements about the primary goals and 
values of the health care professions with the following list which, due 
to the broader perspective suggested by this alternative approach, 
represents a difference in emphasis as well as scope: 
1. promoting health through education 
2. relieving symptoms, pain and, when possible, suffering 
3. maintaining and improving function or minimizing its 
deterioration 
4. avoiding exposure of patients to gratuitous harm or 
unnecessary risk 
5. curing (as opposed to merely prolonging biological life) 
whenever possible 
6. providing comfort measures and/or orchestrating death when 
curing or maintaining functional life is precluded 
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Obviously, these items, like those originally listed on page 34, may 
differ in emphasis or ranking, depending upon the particular case at 
issue. However, it should be noticed that, in making explicit the 
differences in the antecedent and consequent elements between having a 
life and Q~~:i,_flg alive, the alternative bio/psycho/social approach changes 
the focus of these primary goals and values from one that is merely 
reactionary to one that is critical and prospective. 
As a result, rather than being required to respond to a series of 
events that they had no hand in creating, the persons involved are in a 
better position to guide rather than only be guided by events. Instead 
of re-affirming the presumption that the primary role of care-givers and 
patients alike requires them to react individually to aspects of the 
encounter as though responding to a series of isolated and immediate 
'givens,' this alternative approach requires the collaboration of both 
patients and providers in anticipating, understanding and resolving 
problematic elements of an encounter. In other words, the alternative, 
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bio/psycho/social approach considered here makes it possible for persons 
to have lives--to become (or remain) subjects of their lives--in ways 
that simply cannot be accomplished by (putative) lone individuals. 
However, replacing a principlist applications model of problem-
solving like the standard approach with a prospective and participatory 
one, and moving therefore beyond a crisis management mode of 
intervention to one that emphasizes prevention, entails the development 
of a different set of practices between persons and a different set of 
commitments and expectations between persons and their social 
institutions than currently exists. Hence, even more so than in the 
other two cases still to be re-analysed, this particular case 
illustrates how the alternative approach would reconstruct the way 
health care-related social institutions currently function, in order to 
prevent--or, at least, to minimize--the occurrence of such cases. To 
see the practical implications of this claim more clearly, it is helpful 
to understand the limitations of current health care practice. 
In current practice it is a commonplace that, once a person gains 
access to health care services, the standard of that care is unaffected 
by what are considered extraneous, i.e., non-medical, considerations, 
and resources are frequently treated as if they were infinite. The 
delivery system of our health care institution has developed in such a 
way as to insulate providers from patients in several important ways. 
First, it insulates providers from persons and their lives until they 
present either with discrete medical complaints or, less frequently, 
with specific concerns for preventing illness and/or learning how to 
124 
develop healthier lifestyles. Second, it insulates providers from those 
aspects of their patients' lives that are not considered relevant either 
to the diagnosis and treatment of the immediate pathophysiological or 
pathopsychological findings that prompted the patient to seek medical 
care or to the patient's specific concerns with prevention and self-
care. 
This insulation has unwittingly led to a number of difficulties, 
the most notable being the change wrought in the health care providers' 
focus of concern. It has increasingly been diverted from patients as 
persons having lives to patients as isolated sets of symptoms, and from 
the on-going challenge of educating and engaging persons in their own 
preventive and maintenance care (since even preventive care today is 
usually in response to a crisis or feared crisis) to the time-slice 
drama of rescue medicine, with its emphasis on crisis management and 
need for expensive technology. 
As a result, health care providers currently expend huge amounts of 
time, effort and resources rescuing individuals from medical problems 
that often are induced or exacerbated by the standing social 
arrangements, sometimes even social arrangements that were instituted to 
prevent or ameliorate some problem in the first place. In other words, 
many of the medical problems that health care providers must deal with 
today exist as a consequence of trying to address causative factors of 
social and psycho/social conditions as though they were themselves 
independent of and, thus, incapable of affecting health and health care. 
As exemplified in this case, involvement of health care providers 
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too often is limited to a person's hospitalization for a very discrete, 
but artificially isolated problem. The providers in this case have been 
insulated very effectively not only from the social roots of this 
person's condition but also, for the most part, from the kind of 
prospective collaboration with other social institutions that could 
prevent or minimize the occurrence of just such cases as his. 
Another major source of difficulty is the way that the standard 
approach interprets health care providers' obligations in relation to 
health care resources. A commitment to fulfill the goals of health care 
professionals as these are conventionally understood within the standard 
approach presupposes unlimited access to the resources necessary to 
provide that care. The fact of the matter, of course, is that health 
care resources have always been limited and, as our society is just 
beginning to realize, could not be otherwise. Therefore, that these 
professionals experience ethical conflict is inevitable. The goals and 
guiding principles of health care providers are inconsistent with the 
economic goals and intentions of the larger community; but there is 
nothing in the standard approach to assist health care professionals in 
resolving this conflict because its focus in practice is always limited 
to the patient/practitioner relationship, and not that relationship's 
larger psycho/social context. 
As society now faces ever-increasing budgetary difficulties, 
resources are being treated less cavalierly in the larger society and 
health care is therefore becoming even more difficult to deliver. 
Health care providers are also being asked to help conserve resources. 
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They are being told that for too long they have been insulated from the 
'real' world, the world of limited access and limited resources. 
But to expect health care providers to act in the face of these 
conflicting demands, each demand supported by arguments from the same 
narrow set of principles, without at the same time actively 
reconstructing the approach to ethical reflection that is being 
undertaken, is to invite them to compromise their professional 
commitments as hitherto construed by subordinating the needs of 
individual patients to the economic interests of certain segments of 
their society for the sake of expediency. The introduction of the 
concept and practice of managed care, for example, has only served to 
heighten this conflict by placing care-givers, especially physicians, in 
the position of weighing the health care needs of their patients 
directly against their own economic well-being. 
Unlike the alternative approach espoused here, the prevalent view 
of the responsibility of health care providers to patients, like the 
standard approach which grounds it, is not understood to include health 
care professionals undertaking a prospective critique of the means and 
ends of existing social institutions. Nor is this responsibility 
thought to include providing services that other social institutions 
have failed to cover. Echoing a long-standing view of human 
relationships in our society, the health care professions' attitudes 
have overwhelmingly been that their members' professional obligations 
are limited to the symptomatic treatment of individual, identified 
patients having specific, circumscribed complaints. 
127 
Notice in this connection, for example, the language standardly 
used to record a patient's complaint upon hospital admission: "This 
patient presents with ... " The health care team is 'presented' with an 
already circumscribed and isolated problem. While a patient's history 
and physical is done to try to establish the reasons for the troubling 
situation, routinely formulating the problem in this way biases the 
inquiry. That is, the health care providers are expected to identify 
and to focus on correcting only those physiological antecedents directly 
responsible for an isolated phenomenon and/or on counseling the patient 
to modify personal habits contributing directly to it. Therefore, their 
efforts are antecedently structured to deal with these cases in 
isolation from their contexts instead of helping the public, for 
example, to recognize and to come to terms with the larger, more 
extensive social roots of the ills these cases reveal. 
This is why such problematic cases currently tend to be discussed 
as though they were isolated phenomena to be resolved within a tightly 
circumscribed context. The antecedent conditions and potential 
consequences of a case are considered relevant only as they directly 
concern the patient at hand in his or her current condition or those 
other persons (e.g., family members) actively and directly involved in 
the case as it is presently being addressed. As a result, the deeper, 
underlying social antecedents and consequents of an issue are never 
addressed because they are not even recognized as part of the problem. 
Unless compelling reasons can be given to show that the 
bio/psycho/social conditions of personhood, of having a life, can be 
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safely be ignored, the ethical obligations of the health care team must 
be reconstructed so that they extend beyond purely biological and 
technical considerations to include the psycho/social. In other words, 
the presuppositions of the standard approach need to be reconstructed to 
view health care as a socially situated response of socially situated 
individuals, as an element of a continually problematic human world--but 
also one that is, fortunately, always at least potentially correctable. 
Once that reconstruction is properly undertaken, the nature of ethical 
obligation as a situated response of any entity that is bound up in the 
cooperative interrelationships and collaborative practices of having a 
life will become clearer. 
Though widely prevalent, the view of health care being criticized 
here is not universal. Many health care providers do recognize that 
this sort of isolation and insulation is a falsification of the real 
world. They understand that fully addressing this patient's situation 
in this case would require taking into account the social environment 
this man comes from and its causal role in his medical condition, as 
well as his understanding of the health care system and his 
comprehension of his situation, etc. They understand that their 
commitment to patients requires concern for the environment people live 
in and see the connection between their profession and social and 
political action. 
That is, even though such concerns are considered additional and 
optional under the current view of the obligations of health care 
professionals, there are, both recently and historically, important 
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exceptions. Health care providers, and physicians especially, have 
found themselves at the forefront of social action, as activists 
lobbying for social change, from nineteenth century public health 
reforms 2 to organizing against nuclear war in this century. 3 The most 
recent group of activist physicians--Medecin sans frontieres, translated 
into English as "Doctors without Borders"--is French-based, but includes 
physicians from all over the world. The organization is dedicated to 
providing temporary medical assistance in times of natural disasters, 
wars and political or social upheavals. 
What these individuals and groups have in common is a recognition 
that social and political decisions apparently remote from health care 
can place whole groups of persons at risk medically. They have held and 
currently hold that health care professionals have a vital role in 
addressing the underlying problematic sources of these issues, not 
simply patient-by-patient as direct health care providers, but 
politically because of their status as experts in health care and the 
special obligations that status confers. Accordingly, there is 
precedent for the claim that health care providers should understand 
that their commitment to individual, identified patients requires 
concern for and responsiveness to the social and political conditions 
under which individuals become patients. But, advocates of the standard 
approach and of the conventional understanding of obligations of health 
care professions have addressed this position almost not at all, much 
less provided health care professionals with active guidance about how 
it might be carried out. 
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So, it is not surprising that the care-givers involved in the first 
case were troubled. It is likely that this patient was already in the 
process of becoming socially abandoned long before his present medical 
needs were significant and that the medical treatment he required when 
he 'presented' was probably a direct result of that abandonment. This 
is deeply ironic since, just in monetary terms alone, the amount spent 
for his hospitalization on this one occasion could have kept him--and a 
number of others in similar straits--in rent, food and adequate heat for 
well over the entire winter. But the current presuppositions of the 
larger social system permit his abandonment; and the standard approach 
permits his medical needs and their treatment to be regarded as discrete 
facts rather than integrally connected aspects of human life in a social 
world because its presuppositions about persons and their lives shape 
professional ethical thinking in precisely this way. 
To re-iterate, then, the belief that the material conditions of 
this man's existence outside of the contingent circumstances of his 
hospitalization have no bearing on the health care team's ethical 
obligations to patients precisely misses the point of who this patient 
is and why he is where he is. To understand this point is to challenge 
the conception of the health care provider/patient relationship as 
isolated person (or team of persons)-to-isolated person (or person plus 
significant others), and to require, in its place, one that conceives of 
each pole of this relationship as being situated much more richly and 
meaningfully--and therefore, ambiguously--within a broad social context 
that eventually includes, among other things, the entire institutional 
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and societal distribution system. 
While some conflict is inevitable in any society, it is certainly 
not unrealistic to expect that social institutions and their access 
(especially in a democracy) be restructured when they no longer serve as 
effective means for empowering individuals in ways that also benefit and 
strengthen the community as a whole. However, this cannot occur so long 
as these institutions are regarded merely as providers of isolated 
services or products. In reality, social agencies and institutions, at 
their best, 'provide' only one thing: a communicative forum, an 
intellectual space within which individuals can come together to arrange 
ways in which they can prospectively share their strengths and thereby 
minimize the effects of their weaknesses. This means that, if problems 
in health care are to be addressed, the opinions and advice of all sorts 
of experts--in health care, philosophy, history, economics, psychology, 
sociology, etc.--must be prospectively sought and disseminated to the 
public, who can then intelligently participate in the discussion and 
debate necessary to critique and to improve existing strategies for 
resolving these problems. 
Of course, individual health care providers might rightly fear in 
this matter what could be called the 'slippery-slope of obligation.' It 
is a fear that, once involved in the resolution of psycho/social aspects 
of specific cases, the flood-gates will be opened and there will be no 
end to their responsibility for people. Very possibly they would then 
be diverted from effecting diagnosis, prognosis and treatment--matters 
about which they have been trained--and they would become responsible 
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for a host of psycho/social interventions that they are unskilled in 
performing and for which they have been given no effective institutional 
supports. In truth, given the current structure of our social 
institutions and the prevailing view of the responsibilities of health 
care providers to patients, these fears are probably justified. In this 
country today, health care providers are trained--and rewarded--for 
short-term, circumscribed and technically sophisticated medical rescue. 
If the public's expectations about the range of rescue interventions 
increases without an accompanying reconstruction of health care 
professionals' obligations (and possibly preparation) and of how 
relevant resources are allocated, etc.--then our society's health care 
professionals will be caught in an even worse bind than the 
bio/psycho/socially sensitive among them presently face. 
There is no straight-forward way in this country's present health 
care system for providers to counsel society to modify its habits, 
institutions and ways of ethical thinking about patients and health 
care. In fact, the focus of most of our public health programs has been 
almost exclusively to protect society from the spread of disease by 
isolating the ill (e.g., victims of plague), establishing and monitoring 
sanitation codes and overseeing inoculation programs. 4 In other words, 
what are even recognized as legitimate social health care goals and 
appropriate possible courses of action are similarly determined by the 
presuppositions about persons, relationships and obligation on which 
they rest. So, the analysis and application of underlying intuitions--
even the reconstructed ones tentatively set out in chapter four--serve 
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no effective purpose unless and until persons come together to devise 
methods for identifying problems and coordinating the effective use of 
our social resources and institutions towards their resolution. In the 
concluding section of this chapter, I will suggest a possible resolution 
to this current, wide-spread lack. 
Case #2: Medical Treatment For A Social Ill 
A frail, elderly man without relatives or visitors has 
lived in an extended care facility for the past five years. 
While needing physical assistance with daily activities, such 
as bathing and walking, he is oriented to time and place. 
With increasing frequency over the past two years the 
following pattern of behavior is observed: the patient 
abruptly informs his health care providers that he will no 
longer take fluids or food because he wants to die. 
Within several days, the man becomes semi-comatose and is 
sent to the nearest emergency room where he is re-hydrated by 
means of intravenous fluids and/or naso-gastric intubation. 
Upon recovery, he consistently expresses regret that he is 
still alive and disappointment with his care-takers for having 
over-ridden his wishes. The patient temporarily resumes 
adequate consumption of fluids and food, only to repeat the 
cycle in a few months' time. 
Analysis 
The analysis of this case in chapter two ended with the health care 
team in the unenviable position of being forced to choose between 'the 
lesser of two evils,' namely, continuing to send this patient, when he 
becomes medically unstable and semi-comatose, to the emergency room to 
be medically treated for his self-induced dehydration and starvation 
and, in the interim, attempting to dissuade him from persisting in his 
pattern of behavior. The rationale behind this decision was derived 
from an understanding of the criteria for decisional capacity based on 
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the atomistic view of individualism espoused by the standard approach. 
According to this perspective, the principles of autonomy, beneficence 
and justice would best be served by respecting the patient's rationality 
and self-determination until he becomes semi-comatose, at which point, 
the primary injunction, 'do no harm,' would take precedence and the 
care-givers would be bound by their professions' general interpretation 
of the principle of non-maleficence. 
Once again, insofar as the health care team regards the social 
aspects of the case, especially the social disposition of elderly 
patients who need mild to moderate physical assistance, they encounter 
these aspects as ready-made and unchallengeable givens. Most 
communities are unable, unwilling or do not have reason to believe that 
they are ethically obligated to commit social resources towards 
developing feasible strategies to help make patients such as this man 
feel included as a positively valued part of the community. In such an 
environment, there is no compelling reason for this man to believe that 
he has an ethical obligation or any other good reason to stay alive. 
Thus, the 'problem' for the care-givers and this patient is to a 
significant degree pre-set by the community's patterns of actions and 
beliefs, over which the principle agents in this case perceive 
themselves to have little, if any, control. The situation is thus 
perceived as a conflict between the principle of autonomy (i.e., the 
patient's) and the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence (i.e., 
the care-givers' pursuit of their professional goals). 
In the analysis of this case in chapter two, it was noted that it 
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may very well be possible for the care-givers to elicit from the patient 
a coherent account of his behavior and that this should be attempted. 
But more is needed. The patient should not only be challenged to give 
reasons for his behavior; but the care-givers ought also to call into 
question the tacit attitudes and behavior of the community's treatment 
of its indigent and physically impaired elderly. That is, the 
reconstructed approach proposed here requires the care-givers to examine 
critically the social 'givens,' such as communities' obligations to 
their older members, thereby allowing also the reconstruction of the 
'problem' at hand from a broader truly bio/psycho/social perspective. 
For example, the alternative approach could lead us to consider, on 
the basis of its particular bio/psycho/social interpretation of 
individualism, that the decisional capacity of this man has, in fact, 
been impaired. The reasoning might proceed as follows. Based on the 
five criteria described on page 39 of chapter two--i.e., understanding, 
rationality, opportunity, absence from coercion and authenticity--this 
man has not been adequately protected from an external form of coercion, 
namely, intolerable environmental (i.e., social) conditions. Because of 
this, the authenticity of his decision and present pattern of behavior--
a key element of autonomy--might be challenged. However, in questioning 
this man's decisional capacity in this manner, the care-givers must open 
up therewith the possibility of questioning the social conditions 
responsible for creating the external coercion leading to this man's 
psychological disposition. That is, once the broader perspective is 
taken, the caregivers cannot then return to the standard approach, and 
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its focus on individual decision-making at that point. 
But, again, what this approach rests on is the development of a 
different set of presuppositions about persons and a different way of 
framing norms, practices, commitments, expectations and reciprocity 
between individuals and the social institutions they create. And, doing 
so, again, requires replacing a reactionary applications model of 
medical and ethical problem-solving with one that is participatory, 
prospective and able to move beyond a crisis mode to one of prevention. 
A first step in the transformation of the way in which health care 
institutions currently function might be to create a variety of 
interdisciplinary deliberative and advisory bodies. These bodies or 
councils would function as a communicative bridge between the various 
social institutions, professional experts and the public, making 
possible a continuous, prospective monitoring and critique of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the available services of existing social 
institutions and of the presence or absence of a healthy variety of 
strategies for their access by the community's members. 
Just how this step might transform the options of a patient like 
the one in the present case is only hypothetical, because these are not 
alternatives actually offered in this particular case. So until these 
prospective modifications are actually tried--in the going and its 
consequences as opposed to the necessary, but still merely preliminary 
speculative brainstorming--and the extent of their effects are measured, 
assessed and compared to what we would hope to achieve, their efficacy 
will remain an open question. However, this alternative approach to 
137 
addressing the case, takes better account of its b10/psycho/sucial 
realities and requires us to keep searching for practical ways to 
respect these bio/psycho/social realities in the actions we take. This 
approach, by keeping the antecedents and consequents of issues open to 
potential inquiry, prevents the resolutions of specific cases from 
becoming reified and regarded as a variety of standard practice that is 
so fixed that it is immune to future, critical examination and revision. 
Case #3: Hyperacute Rejection Syndrome 
A 26 year old woman developed myocarditis (a severely 
damaging inflammation of the heart which interferes with the 
ability of the heart to pump blood efficiently) during an 
otherwise unremarkable pregnancy. Although she eventually 
delivered a premature but viable and healthy infant, the 
patient's own cardiac function deteriorated to the point where 
a transplant was the only remaining chance for saving her 
life. After delivery, a properly matched donor heart 
eventually became available and she underwent a 
transplantation that involved no immediate complications. 
Several hours post-transplant and while still in the 
recovery room, the patient's cardiac function rapidly began to 
deteriorate. It was apparent that she was experiencing a 
'hyperacute rejection' (a process of organ transplant 
rejection whose etiology is poorly understood and which in 
about 95% of cases leads to repeat rejection should another 
transplant be attempted). The patient was placed on 
mechanical pump support as the newly transplanted heart could 
no longer provide the pumping action required to keep the 
patient alive. While she is currently awake, able to speak 
and rational, the mechanical pump is, at its present stage of 
technological development, only a stop-gap measure. 
Therefore, if this patient does not receive another heart 
transplant, she will die. 
When a heart which is a good match for this patient 
finally becomes available, it also happens to be an equally 
good match for another potential recipient who is awaiting 
transplant for the first time. The hospital ethics committee 
is asked whether the transplant team should re-transplant this 
patient or give the heart to the other waiting candidate. 
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Analysis 
The analysis of this case in chapter two ended with the transplant 
team in the unenviable position of having to choose between a number of 
conflicting ethical obligations: (1) to the patient with hyperacute 
rejection syndrome, (2) to the other potential first-time recipient (who 
has a significantly greater chance of survival), (3) to their profession 
and (4) to the community. After weighing the implications of what the 
principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice seemed 
to require, the care-givers decided that, all things considered, 
offering re-transplantation to the patient with hyperacute rejection 
syndrome was the most compelling of their obligations. The rationale 
behind the decision was based on a utilitarian argument that their 
decision would, overall, preserve the greatest number of interests and 
values that these conflicting principles are said to under-write. 
However, once again, the care-givers involved in this case are 
presented with a set of conflicting social expectations arising from 
social structures the majority of which they have no available 
mechanisms for challenging. In today's understanding of the transplant 
team/patient relationship and through the institutions that embody that 
understanding, the team is virtually compelled to re-transplant the 
patient with hyperacute rejection. On the other hand, it is the 
community's tacit assumption that the proper role of health care 
professionals includes gate-keeping at the bedside, in which care-givers 
are expected to be responsible for efficient resource allocation at the 
bed-side on a case-by-case basis. Clearly there is a clash of 
principles at work here and present thinking includes no 'super-
principle,' no fixed precedence principle that can be applied in the 
event that principles conflict. 
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Obviously, in any scenario where scarce resources require the 
adoption of some kind of distribution scheme, gate-keeping must occur. 
However, for a distribution scheme to have any degree of accuracy, 
effectiveness and equity, it is necessary for the person or group of 
persons responsible for the distribution to have the same general 
relationship with and obligations to all of the potential beneficiaries. 
While the input of a care-giver's information from the bedside is 
necessary for data accumulation needed for distribution, it is not 
sufficient for making the care-giver an appropriate distributor of 
scarce resources at the bedside. Thus, while care-givers, by virtue of 
their special expertise, have an obligation to serve as technical 
advisors to the community, they cannot, by virtue of their special 
relationships with identified patients, be expected to act 
simultaneously as gate-keepers. Someone or some group representing all 
the potential beneficiaries must perform this role. 
It is the case that, whenever a person applies a principle, follows 
a rule, assumes a role, etc., she is tacitly endorsing the commitments 
implied by those activities. That is, a care-giver's participation in 
gate-keeping at the bedside implies that she accepts this practice as 
one of her legitimate roles and, accordingly, will assume responsibility 
for the consequences of her actions. The fact that she recognizes that 
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there is a conflict of interests and principles occurring signals the 
beginning of critical, reflective thought. Pitting each interest and 
principle against one another and weighing the consequences without 
attempting to subject the implications of the particular antecedents and 
consequents of the case to careful scrutiny prevents controlled inquiry 
and replaces it with the ethical equivalent of following the path of 
least resistance. 
Accordingly, as has been argued in the previous two cases, it is 
crucial that care-givers have recourse to some mechanism by which they 
can challenge the ethical appropriateness and validity of society's 
demands upon them respecting this issue. Rather than presenting them 
with a fait accompli that ends inquiry and requires them to engage in a 
post hoc justification of their actions, a bio/psycho/social approach 
opens the possibility of questioning the 'givens' and of making explicit 
the implicit--and often contradictory--presuppositions behind social 
aspects of cases, aspects that are tacitly accepted and endorsed social 
practices. 
In the immediacy of any particular patient's crisis, of course, 
there is no time to put a broad socially responsible decision-making 
process in place to determine the proper use of scarce transplant 
resources. But that only means that health care providers who strive to 
do their ethical reflection on the basis of bio/psycho/social 
presuppositions, rather than the standard approach, must begin well in 
advance of such crises--must begin now--to critique and seek 
modification of institutional structures and practices that foreclose 
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the full actualization of the possibilities this approach reveals. 
The Ethics Committee: Solution or Further Symptom? 
One response to the present ethical difficulties facing 
patient/health care provider relationships is the ethics committee. 
Historically such committees have been constituted by individual health 
care facilities to help their staff, their patients and a very 
circumscribed local community to make better informed decisions about 
the specific health care options offered by that facility. But, there 
is evidence to suggest that ethics committees, when properly organized 
and prepared, are also eminently suited to provide the sort of forum in 
which disparately functioning social institutions can be coordinated to 
benefit maximally both health care as a social institution as well as 
the public it serves. 5 
However, the majority of ethics committees currently functioning in 
this country are ham-strung by the same sorts of difficulties already 
described as burdening and limiting health care teams and individual 
health care: isolation, insulation, being co-opted by special interests 
and, most importantly, being confronted with piece-meal, ready-made 
problems that individually need resolution on an emergency basis. That 
is, they face the same sort of faits accomplis that are so 
detrimental to the effectiveness of social institutions in general and 
health care professionals in particular. 
This difficulty is made most evident when we compare an 
idealization of the most effective ethics committee with the way in 
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which most ethics committees currently function. Ideally speaking an 
ethics committee has three functions: education, policy consultation and 
case consultation (listed in order of importance). More specifically, 
these functions can be described as including: 
1. education: in the course of educating itself, it also educates 
health care staff, patient/clients, their significant others 
and the community at large about ethical issues in general as 
well as those specifically affecting the relationships between 
the facility and its community of staff and patients/clients 
2. policy consultation: it assists with institutional policy 
review by helping to develop, review and up-date the 
facility's health care policies 
3. case consultation: it provides expertise and support for 
health care staff, patient/clients and their significant 
others in health care decision-making by helping all of the 
parties concerned to develop the insight necessary to identify 
and analyse aspects of individual cases that have become 
ethically troubling and to suggest strategies for their 
resolution 
Though our experience with ethics committees is limited, it still 
suggests that, when these responsibilities are conscientiously met, in 
this particular order of importance, a committee's ability to devise 
preventive strategies actually succeeds within the institution and 
minimizes the need to devise reactionary or defensive strategies for the 
constant, superficial and purely symptomatic treatment of full-blown 
ethical conflicts and dilemmas. That is, when the first two functions 
are adequately met, the third function requires a relatively little 
investment of time and effort. When the last responsibility is the only 
one emphasized--which is often the case with many existing ethics 
committees--it becomes impossible for a committee to control inquiry 
sufficiently to provide anything more substantial than temporary, piece-
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meal and already polarized, standard approach-based solutions to 
problems already 'given.' Ethics committees that choose to deal only 
with the last function never have the time to get beyond it to deal with 
the first two functions, the only preventive strategies that have a 
chance of effectively dealing with ethical issues prospectively and 
resolving specific, concrete cases via controlled, systematic and 
progressive inquiry. 
Every effort must be made to avoid this situation since, as I have 
argued, the problem as 'given' is outside of controlled inquiry insofar 
as it offers no guarantee of an adequate assessment of the roots of an 
issue. That is, even though ethics committees can potentially play the 
important role of responsible decision-making described in the previous 
section, they are often not able to do so because existing forces within 
their institution divert them away from the first two roles and into an 
exclusive--or nearly so--preoccupation with the third. The development 
of ethics committees is one hopeful move in the right direction. But 
unless not only the social structures themselves, but the 
presuppositions about persons and their relationships upon which they 
rest are reconstructed, most of our ethical thinking in health care 
ethics will remain unaffected. 
CONCLUDI~G REMARKS 
The aim of this dissertation has been to examine critically a 
standard approach to the process of identifying, analysing and resolving 
problematic cases in the field of health care ethics. In the course 
this examination, certain presuppositions that are central to this 
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approach have been identified, and their antecedents and consequents 
(i.e., origin, function and implications) explored. These 
presuppositions concern the nature of persons, describing as 'given,' or 
essential, attributes that are, in reality, the result of a particular 
strain of human development. The results of this examination suggest 
that this set of unreflectively held presuppositions is indicative of a 
deeper, uncritically held methodological presupposition: namely, that 
there are aspects of experience that can be fixed and captured by 
language, conceptualized into principles and then 'applied' in 
algorithmic fashion to solve problems. 
In this dissertation I have offered an alternative approach to 
clinical encounters between patients and care-givers which, while it 
does not abandon principles, argues that principles, applied without 
understanding the bio/psycho/social dynamics of a particular case can 
cause us to miss much that is central to that encounter. The 
alternative approach advocated in this work seeks resolution to 
ethically problematic cases through the attempt to understand the 
complex interrelationships that have developed between patients and 
their entire intellectual, emotional, social and material environment, 
including significant others, care-givers, communities and cultures, and 
by then devising prospective, as opposed to reactionary, strategies 
capable of resolving conflicts that arise in the course of these 
interrelationships. In so doing, this approach denies the validity of 
ethical behavior based on the 'application' of either static principles 
or individualistic and subjective intuitions. 
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My account denies the possibility of understanding either the 
individual or community in isolation from one another. They are not 
rigid or static and isolated conceptions, but fluid and dynamic 
interrelationships within the organism/environment complex. The 
integrity of each of the parts is, therefore, dependent upon activities 
which promote the continued integrity and solidarity of the whole. This 
requires the cooperation of persons in recognizing, communicating, and 
respecting each others' bio/psycho/social perspectives as providing a 
uniquely necessary element so essential to the intelligent (which 
includes ethical) direction and integration of our personal habits and 
social customs and institutions. 
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